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THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF USING BIG DATA TO 
REGULATE NONPROFITS 
Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer• 
Abstract: For the optimist, government use of "Big Data" involves the careful collection 
of information from numerous sources. The government then engages in expert analysis of 
those data to reveal previously undiscovered patterns. Discovering patterns revolutionizes the 
regulation of criminal behavior, education, health care, and many other areas. For the 
pessimist, government use of Big Data involves the haphazard seizure of information to 
generate massive databases. Those databases render privacy an illusion and result in arbitrary 
and discriminatory computer-generated decisions. The reality is, of course, more 
complicated. On one hand, government use of Big Data may lead to greater efficiency, 
effectiveness, and transparency; on the other hand, such use risks inaccurate conclusions, 
invasions of privacy, unintended discrimination, and increased government power. Until 
recently, these were theoretical issues for nonprofits because federal and state regulators did 
not use Big Data to oversee them. But nonprofits can no longer ignore these issues, as the 
primary federal regulator is now emphasizing "data-driven" methods to guide its audit 
selection process, and state regulators are moving forward with plans to create a single, 
online portal to collect required filings. In addition, regulators are making much of the data 
they collect available in machine-readable form to researchers, journalists, and other 
members of the public. The question now is whether regulators, researchers, and nonprofits 
can learn from the Big Data experiences of other agencies and private actors to optimize the 
use of Big Data with respect to nonprofits. This Article explores the steps that nonprofit 
regulators have taken toward using Big Data techniques to enhance their ability to oversee 
the nonprofit sector. It then draws on the Big Data experiences of government regulators and 
private actors in other areas to identify the potential promises and perils of this approach to 
regulatory oversight of nonprofits. Finally, it recommends specific steps regulators and 
others should take to ensure that the promises are achieved and the perils avoided. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 8, 2015, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service's 
Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division highlighted the new 
"data-driven approach" the IRS would take to capitalize on the 
"tremendous amount of information" it collects. 1 She was elaborating on 
an internal "Program Letter'' released late in 2014 that referred to "Data-
Driven Decision-Making" but provided almost no explanation of what 
this term meant other than cryptic commitments to develop 
"sophisticated analytics," to conduct "analysis to identify opportunities 
to improves processes," to apply "analytics and research to improve 
program effectiveness," and to allocate resources "using a data-driven 
I. Sunita Lough, Comm'r of the Tax Exempt & Gov't Entities Div., Internal Revenue Serv., 
Remarks at the Meeting of the Exempt Organizations Committee of the American Bar Association 
Section of Taxation (May 8, 2015), in EO TAX J. 2015-96 (2015). 
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approach to target existing and emerging high-risk areas."2 For anyone 
familiar with recent technological developments, however, these 
buzzwords signaled that the IRS was moving in a new direction with its 
oversight of tax-exempt nonprofit organizations in the United States that 
could be boiled down to two words: Big Data. 
Oversimplifying, Big Data refers to the collection and analysis of 
information that is so large in scope, changes so rapidly, and varies in 
structure to such an extent that it is not amenable to conventional 
database techniques of the recent past, but instead requires sophisticated 
computerized methods to adequately gather and learn from this 
information. 3 Rapid improvements in storage capacity and computing 
power have made it possible to both collect and analyze such data. 
While the term Big Data as it is used today is only a little over twenty 
years old, it already has developed technological, academic, and societal 
meanings.4 At its heart, however, Big Data refers to the rapid 
accumulation of digital data, from social media posts to cell phone 
locations, as well as efforts to use such data to discover significant 
patterns that inform and improve public policy making, business 
decisions, and personal choices. 5 
A couple of noteworthy examples have highlighted the potential 
benefits and dangers of Big Data. Starting in 2002, retailer Target used 
customers' shopping patterns to determine if it was likely they were 
pregnant.6 While Target apparently did this only so it could better 
customize its advertising to those customers, it was wisely wary about 
how its customers would react if they learned how much Target knew 
2. SUNITA LoUGH, TAX EXEMPT & GoV'T ENTITIES DIV., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TEJGE 
PROGRAM LETTER FY 2015, at 3 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 Program Letter], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/tege_fy 15 _program_letter.pdf [httpsJ/perma.cc/HP2B-A VSP). 
3. See generally FRANCIS X. DIEBOLD, ON THE ORIGIN(S) AND DEVELOPMENT OF "BIG DATA": 
THE PHENOMENON, THE TERM, AND THE DISCIPLINE (2018), 
https://www.sas.upenn.edu/~fdiebold/papers/paperl l2/Diebold_Big__Data.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T59X-D4QW] (discussing the origin of the term "Big Data"). 
4. See Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a 
Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO. COMMC'N & Soc'Y 662, 663 (2012) 
(defining Big Data "as a cultural, technological, and scholarly phenomenon"); DIEBOLD, supra note 
3, at 3 (discussing the first uses of the term Big Data in its current sense). 
5. See JAMES MANYiKA ET AL., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND 
PRODUCTIVITY 1-2 (201 I), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/McKinsey 
%20Digital/Ow%20Insights/Big%20data%20The%20next%20frontiet"/o20for%20innovation/MGI_big__data_e 
xec_summary.ashx [httpsJ/perma.cc/K6GP-MU7Y] ( discussing potential positive uses ofBig Data). 
6. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html [https://perma.cc/4P7H-G3L4] 
(explaining how private companies use Big Data). 
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about them (including one instance where a father learned his teenage 
daughter was pregnant because she received baby-related Target ads in 
the mail).7 
Government use of Big Data can be even more unnerving. Edward 
Snowden famously disclosed that the National Security Agency had 
been collecting telephone metadata-such as the time and location of 
calls, as opposed to their content-for every call generated by Verizon 
customers, so that these data could then be analyzed using various 
methods to identify certain connections of interest. 8 While Congress 
reacted to these disclosures by amending the relevant federal statutory 
provisions, it is unclear whether those amendments prevent continued 
collection of such data.9 Other government uses of Big Data methods 
include environmental protection and Medicare and Medicaid fraud 
prevention. 10 
The IRS's Big Data move with respect to nonprofits highlights that 
data about such organizations may have reached a critical tipping point 
in several respects. First, the IRS's improved analysis of the information 
it already collects raises the possibility of more efficient, effective, and 
transparent federal oversight of nonprofits. Second, state regulators are 
striving to enhance their own oversight capabilities by centralizing their 
collection of information relating to charitable nonprofits through a 
"Single Portal" initiative. 11 Third, as a result of long-standing federal 
7. Id. 
8. See Margaret Hu, Bulk Biometric Metadata Collection, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1425, 1452-55 (2018). 
9. Id. at 1462--68 ( explaining the reasons for this lack of clarity and concluding that "under the 
USA FREEDOM Act, it is unclear whether bulk metadata collection will cease and, thus, whether 
mass suspicion-less tracking ofmetadata by the intelligence community will continue in an under-
regulated manner"). 
IO. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-710, MEDICARE: CMS FRAUD 
PREVENTION SYSTEM USES CLAIMS ANALYSIS TO ADDRESS FRAUD 4 (2017) (outlining a 
congressionally-mandated data analytic system to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in the Medicare 
fee-for-service program); Meredith Somers, EPA Using Data Science to Save Environment, Support 
Agencies, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Oct. 18, 2016), https://federalnewsnetwork.com/technology-
main/2016/10/epa-using-data-science-save-environment-support-agencies/ [https://perma.cc/32EW-
GP JJ] (discussing EPA Big Data initiatives); see generally SUBCOMM. ON NETWORKING AND 
INFORMATIONAL TECH. RESEARCH AND DEV., NAT'L SCI. AND TECH. COUNCIL, SUPPLEMENT TO 
THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 46-49 (2017), 
https:/ /www.nitrd.gov/pubs/20 l 8supplement/FY20 l 8NITRDSupplement. pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4BYL-LKNP] (describing Big Data agency investments across the federal 
government). 
11. GuideStar, MRFP, and City Base Creating Single System for State Charity Registration and 
Reporting, GUIDESTAR (Apr. 4, 2018) [hereinafter GUIDESTAR, Press Release], 
https://leam.guidestar.org/news/news-releases/nasco-guidestar-mrfp-and-citybase-creating-single-
system-for-state-charity-registration-and-reporting [https ://perma. cc/6KU 5-VWRC]; Registration 
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laws, recent litigation, and the efforts of several private organizations, 
the data collected by the IRS are also generally accessible to the public, 
including journalists and researchers, with even greater access in the 
future given the recent enactment of legislation to expand the electronic 
filing obligations of tax-exempt nonprofits. 12 
The promise of Big Data for government oversight of nonprofits is 
similar to its promise in other regulatory areas: greater efficiency, 
effectiveness, and transparency with respect to enforcement of existing 
legal rules and development of new rules. 13 Additional benefits that 
could accrue from the public's ability to use such data include better 
informing donors, customers, members, and nonprofit leaders about the 
nonprofits of particular interest to them. 14 But as in other areas, Big Data 
brings possible perils: bad data, bad analysis, over reliance, threats to 
privacy, discriminatory effects, unchecked government power, and other 
legal concerns, including constitutional ones. 15 
This Article considers what lessons can be learned from Big Data's 
application in other areas to inform its emerging application to 
government and public oversight of nonprofits. While focused primarily 
on the United States, these lessons are also applicable to other countries, 
many of which are also moving in the Big Data direction with respect to 
overseeing nonprofits within their jurisdictions. 16 The ultimate goal is to 
provide a roadmap for fulfilling the promises of Big Data while avoiding 
its perils. This roadmap should include measures to ensure awareness of 
the positive and negative ramifications of Big Data, to rigorously 
evaluate the improvements to efficiency and effectiveness resulting from 
a Big Data approach, and to implement precautions to avoid or minimize 
the perils it presents. 
Part I examines the data and analytic tools currently available to the 
IRS, state regulators, and the public. It also examines the data and tools 
that may be available to them in the near future, including based on the 
experience of nonprofit regulators in other countries with Big Data 
techniques. Part II considers the promise of the Big Data approach for 
improving government oversight of and public knowledge about 
nonprofits. Part III explores the perils of this approach for the nonprofit 
and Filing Portal, Single Portal Initiative, MRFP (2016) [hereinafter MRFP, lNc.], 
http://mrfpinc.org/about.html [https://perma.cc/QKN9-QT2U]. 
12. See infra note 64 and accompanying text; infra section I.C. 
13. See infra section II.A. 
14. See infra section 11.C. 
15. See infra Part III. 
16. See infra section I.D. 
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sector, and ways that regulators and the public can avoid potential 
missteps. 
Part IV concludes with recommendations for ensuring that Big Data 
as applied to nonprofits ultimately benefits oversight of the nonprofit 
sector without unduly harming that sector or the public more generally. 
Those recommendations include the IRS, state regulators, and their 
independent oversight bodies rigorously evaluating the effectiveness of 
Big Data approaches and identifying ways to enhance the accuracy of 
the information they collect and to protect against unnecessary invasions 
of privacy and prohibited discrimination; researchers being conscious of 
the accuracy and representational limitations of the data available; and 
nonprofits being sensitive to the increased visibility of their government 
filings and other information. These measures will help ensure the 
promises of Big Data are realized, while minimizing exposure to the 
perils it creates. 
I. BIG DATA AND NONPROFITS 
As a brief background on data and datasets generally, Big Data 
datasets are often characterized as having at least three dimensions: 
volume, measured in bytes; velocity, measured by how close creation is 
to real time; and variety, in terms of degree of structure. 17 There are no 
clear thresholds along any of these dimensions that determine when a 
dataset becomes Big Data, especially since any such lines would be 
vulnerable to technological change. That said, volume for Big Data tends 
to be so large that it is measured in terabytes or petabytes of data. 18 To 
give a sense of scale, the IRS Director for Research Databases reported 
in 2013 that the then-volume of data collected by the IRS in its 
Compliance Data Warehouse was approximately 1.3 petabytes. 19 
17. See ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA 
INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 68 (2014); DOUG LANEY, 3D DATA MANAGEMENT: 
CONTROLLING DATA VOLUME, VELOCITY, AND VARIETY I (2001), https://blogs.gartner.com/doug-
laney/files/2012/0 l/ad949-3D-Data-Management-Controlling-Data-Volume-Velocity-and-
Variety. pdf [https://perma.cc/4BN7-JBD3]. 
18. See STEVEN FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS, DATA MINING AND BIG DATA: MYTHS 
MISCONCEPTIONS AND METHODS 13 (2014); MANYrKA ET AL., supra note 5, at I. A terabyte is 
approximately 1000 gigabytes and a petabyte is approximately 1000 terabytes. See FINLAY, supra, at 13. 
19. Jeff Butler, Presentation at the Government Big Data Symposium 4 (Mar. 5-6, 2013), 
https:/ /docplayer.net/16174543-Big-data-and-analytics-at-the-irs.html [https://perma.cc/8Ff A-YN6W]. A 
recent new story stated that the Compliance Data Warehouse "has about 40 data sets on taxpayers 
stretching back more than 30 years." Vidya Kawi, AI Helping IRS Detect Tax Crimes with Fewer 
Resources, LAw360 (Dec. 5, 2018, 8:58 PM EST), https://www.law360.com/articles/1108419/ai-helping-
irs-detect-tax-crimes-with-fewer-resources [https://perma.cc/W 6E3-A W 62]. 
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Velocity for many large datasets now approaches real-time collection, as 
illustrated by automatic recording of users' searches and other online 
activities.20 Variety reflects the extent to which data is organized into 
fixed fields, like in spreadsheets, versus data that is less fixed, like in 
emails or tweets.21 
The process of analyzing expansive datasets is part of the broader 
field known as "knowledge discovery in databases" or KDD, with the 
"process of knowledge discovery ... often subdivided in several steps, 
such as: (1) capturing and cleansing; (2) aggregating; (3) data mining; 
and (4) interpreting."22 All of these steps rely on "machine learning," 
which is "[a] subspecialty of computer science (within a field 
historically called 'artificial intelligence') concerned with the design and 
development of algorithms that allow computers to evolve behaviors 
based on empirical data."23 It is this ability of computer systems to 
modify their behaviors without human intervention that allows them to 
process the vast amounts of quickly changing and various types of data 
that make up Big Data datasets.24 
This Part examines the extent to which Big Data datasets already exist 
for nonprofits. It also considers the related issue of to what extent the 
IRS and others have developed analytical tools, and the potential for the 
emergence of additional datasets and tools in the near future. 
A. The Internal Revenue Service 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has been gathering data about 
taxpayers since its initial creation as the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
more than 150 years ago.25 It began computerizing the collection and 
analysis of its data more than fifty years ago.26 About fifteen years ago, 
the IRS started exploring how it could use the data it collects in a 
20. EXEC. OmCE OF THE PRESIDENf, BIG DATA: SEIZING 0PPORTIJNITIES, PREsERVING V AWES 5 (2014), 
https://obarnawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/defuult/files/docslbig_data_privacy _report_may _ 1_2014 .pelf 
[https://pennacc/JD5M-RGUB]. 
21. See MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 5, at 33 (discussing how "structured data" resides in fixed 
fields, as in a spreadsheet, while "unstructured data" does not reside in fixed fields, as in the body of 
an email). 
22. MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW 31-32 (2015). 
23. MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 5, at 29. 
24. See KITCHIN, supra note 17, at 102----04 ( explaining the role of machine learning in the 
analysis of Big Data). 
25. Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative History, 53 
ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 723-25 (2001). 
26. Id. at 766--67. 
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comprehensive way to enforce the nation's tax laws.27 Such use includes 
not only collecting and analyzing return information provided by 
taxpayers and other entities, but also collecting and analyzing 
information obtained from other sources. The IRS now gathers data from 
many commercial and public data pools-including social media sites 
like Facebook, lnstagram, and Twitter-and plans to gather more 
information along these lines.28 Therefore, the 1.3 petabytes of 
compliance-related data the IRS had gathered as of 2013 reflects not 
only information provided in tax returns and other filings, which only 
accumulates at about fifteen-to-twenty terabytes per year, but also a 
substantial amount of data collected from other sources. 29 This 
represents an almost ten-fold increase in data during the five years from 
2008.30 The IRS recently estimated that during the ten years from 2007 
to 2017 its data volume increased a hundredfold. 31 These efforts are in 
addition to other financial-related data collection by the federal 
government. 32 Unfortunately, more recent information regarding the 
27. David DeBarr & Maury Harwood, Relational Mining for Compliance Risk, in IRS REsEARCH 
BULLETIN: RECENT IRS RESEARCH ON TAX ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE, PlJBLICATION 1500, at 
175, 175 (2005), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/04debarr.pdf[https://permacc/32QF-RTYC]. 
28. See Siri Bulusu, 'Doubling Down' on Big Data Upgrades IRS Fraud Investigations, DAILY TAX 
REP. (Dec. 5, 2018, 6:22 PM) ("The IRS can currently track data coming from electronic transactions, cell 
phones, live video feeds, and social media."); Kimberly A Houser & Debra Sanders, The Use of Big Data 
Analytics by the IRS: Efficient Solutions or the End of Privacy as We Know It?, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 817, 819 (2017) ("The IRS uses big data analytics to mine commercial and public data pools including 
social media sites (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter)."); Kauri, supra note 19 (IRS $99 million, 
seven-year contract with a private contractor "to sniff out tax cheats by mining data from tax returns, bank 
reports, property records and even social media posts"); Justin Rohrlich, The Taxman Browseth: The IRS 
Wants to Use Social Media to Catch Tax Cheats, QUARTZ, (Dec. 26, 2018) (citing INTERNAL REvENUE 




29. See Butler, supra note 19, at 4 (explaining that Compliance Data Warehouse information 
includes third-party data); Eric Lai, Been Audited Lately? Blame the IRS's Massive, Supe,fast Data 
Warehouse, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 22, 2008, 1:00 AM) (discussing how data from one year's 
worth of tax returns are fifteen-to-twenty terabytes), 
https:/ /www.computerworld.com/article/2536160/business-intelligence/been-audited-lately-
blame-the-irs-s-massive-superfast-data-warehouse.htrnl [https://perma.ccNDE2-5WC6]. 
30. See Lai, supra note 29 (stating that as of 2008, the Compliance Data Warehouse had 150 
terabytes of information). 
31. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2018-2022, at 19 (2018) (stating that 
data volume increased 100 times from 2007 to 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p3744.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4HYL-URXU). 
32. See, e.g., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, AUDIT REPORT, TERRORIST 
FINANCING/MONEY LAUNDERING: FINCEN's BSA IT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM Is MEETING 
MILESTONES, BUT OVERSIGHT REMAINS CRUCIAL I (2012), 
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volume of data the IRS has collected, and from what specific sources, is 
not readily available. 
The Tax-Exempt and Government Entities Division (TE/GE) of the 
IRS is somewhat late to the party, although there were indications as 
early as 2003 that it was considering more rigorous use of data. 33 This is 
not to say that the IRS has not previously sought to collect and 
computerize data regarding tax-exempt nonprofit organizations. As early 
as the 1970s, the IRS had already begun to enter certain information into 
its computer systems from annual returns filed by the financially larger 
tax-exempt organizations.34 But the 2014 Program Letter appears to be 
the first indication that this part of the IRS was taking advantage of Big 
Data techniques to analyze its collected data. 35 
Being late has the advantage, however, of benefiting from the 
experience of the Research, Applied Analytics and Statistics Division 
(RAAS) of the IRS, which implements Big Data projects for the 
agency.36 RAAS is the result of a 2016 merger of two previous IRS 
offices: the Office of Research, Analysis, and Statistics with the Office 
of Compliance Analytics.37 The former has been the main provider of 
statistics about the federal tax system for at least a decade, while the IRS 
established the latter several years ago to house the IRS's data analytics 
activities.38 As of late 2017, RAAS had approximately 350 employees 
https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-
structure/ig/ Audit%20Reports%20and%20Testimonies/OIG 12077. pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/8T7 5-
L2EG] (discussing how in 1990, Congress created the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement 
Network ("FinCEN"), which administers the Bank Secrecy Act); Steven A. Bercu, Toward 
Universal Surveillance in an Information Age Economy: Can We Handle Treasury's New Police 
Technology?, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 394-400 (1994) (outlining a FinCEN expert system that 
analyzes financial data collected from government, private, and foreign databases). 
33. See J. Christine Harris, IRS Will Enlist New EO Units to Complement Division's Work, Say 
Officials, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 150 (2003) (discussing how the new Data Analysis Unit will 
assist IRS Exempt Organizations division). 
34. John Copeland, Financial Data from Form 990 Returns for Exempt Charitable, Religious, 
and Educational Organizations and Private Foundations, in 1 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY 
THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PuBuc NEEDS 143 (1977). 
35. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
36. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX AoMIN., THE RESEARCH, APPLIED ANALYTICS, AND 
STATISTICS ORGANIZATION PROJECT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES NEED IMPROVEMENT 1-2 (2018), 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2018reports/201810026fr.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/846Z-
9FB3] [hereinafter TIGTA]. 
37. See id. at I. 
38. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE OFFICE OF RESEARCH, ANALYSIS, 
AND STATISTICS NEEDS TO ADDRESS COMPUTER SECURITY WEAKNESSES 1 (2008) (explaining the 
Office of Research, Analysis, and Statistics' role), 
https:/ /www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2008reports/200820 l 76fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM5V -
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and fifty additional personnel detailed from other agencies or student 
volunteers, plus approximately 300 contractors.39 
TE/GE expected to have algorithms developed by RAAS in place by 
April 1, 2017, to select annual information returns filed by tax-exempt 
nonprofits for audit.40 It also planned to run the returns filed by the 
financially largest tax-exempt organizations and by private foundations, 
which are a subset of charitable tax-exempt organizations, through that 
selection process.41 The most recent TE/GE Work Plan indicates that the 
IRS has not only accomplished these goals but has also expanded these 
efforts to include the shorter return that tax-exempt nonprofits with 
relatively modest assets and annual revenues may use.42 While the latest 
program letter from TE/GE does not provide much in terms of specifics, 
it confirms that TE/GE continues to use "data-driven approaches" and to 
collaborate with RAAS in doing so.43 And the acting TE/GE 
Commissioner recently stated that over 50% of TE/GE's examinations 
that the division closed in fiscal year 2018 were selected using data-
driven approaches.44 
As these plans indicate, the IRS' s primary source of information 
relating to tax-exempt nonprofits are their annual information returns-
the Form 990 series-although an IRS official has stated the IRS is also 
A9YD]; Nonprofits Decry Wasteful Government Programs, 55 NO. 6 Gov'T CONTRACTOR~ 43 
(2013) (establishing Office of Compliance Analytics). 
39. TIGTA, supra note 36, at 1. 
40. Alexander Reid, Outline for News from the IRS and Treasury (Jan. 6, 2017), in EO TAX J. 
2017-4 (2017). 
41. Id. at 180. 
42. See TAX EXEMPT AND Gov'T ENTrrrES DIV., FY 2018 WORK PLAN 7 (2017) [hereinafter TFJGE, 
2018], httpsJ/www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tege_fy2018_ work_plan.pdf [httpsJ/perma.cc/Q8H7-9MX2] 
(discussing compliance models developed for Form 990, Fonn 990-EZ, and Form 990-PF); Form 990 
Series Which Forms Do Exempt Organizations File Filing Phase In, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 
[hereinafter IRS, Form 990 Series], httpsJ/www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/form-990-series-which-
forms-do-exempt-organizations-file-filing-phase-in [httpsJ/perma.cc/MCE2-66Z6]. 
43. DAVID W. HORTON & ROBERTS. CHOI, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX EXEMPT & Gov'T 
ENTITIES DIV., FISCAL YEAR 2019 PROGRAM LETTER 2, 6 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/p53l3.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M3S-EKJV]; see also DAVID W. HORTON & ROBERTS. CHOI, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX EXEMPT & GoV'T ENTITIES DIV., FISCAL YEAR 2018 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS LETTER 5 (2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5329.pdf 
[https://penna.cc/EW85-WFD7] (describing "Data-Driven Approaches" used in the most recently 
completed fiscal year). 
44. Margaret Von Lienen, Acting Dir., Exempt Orgs. Div., Internal Revenue Serv., Remarks at 
the Meeting of the TEGE Exempt Organizations Council (Dec. 11, 2018), in EO TAX J. 2018-248 
(2018); Wesley Elmore, TE/GE Eyeing Changes to Exam Process, TAX NOTES (Dec. 10, 2018), 
http s :/ /www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/ audits/te-ge-eyeing-changes-exam-
process/2018/12/07 /28npd [https://perrna.cc/K.4KA-SURQ]. 
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using other, unspecified "external data."45 With the exception of certain 
religious, governmental, and political organizations, as well as 
organizations included in group returns that aggregate information for a 
set of related nonprofits, all tax-exempt nonprofits are required to file a 
Form 990 series return.46 These organizations filed more than 1.5 million 
Form 990 series returns annually in recent years.47 The breakdown by 
type of annual return for fiscal year 2015 shows approximately 260,000 
Forms 990 and 125,000 shorter Forms 990-EZ filed by the most 
common types of these organizations, and another approximately 
100,000 Forms 990-PF filed by private foundations. 48 A variety of other 
annual return types comprise the remaining million or so returns filed 
each year, but the majority of them are likely the very short, ("e-filed") 
Form 990-N that can be used by financially small tax-exempt nonprofits. 
For example, more than 600,000 nonprofits filed the Form 990-N for 
fiscal year 2017.49 While most tax-exempt nonprofits are also required to 
file an initial application for recognition of their exempt status, these 
applications are likely much less useful for purposes of detecting non-
compliance because they usually represent uncertain predictions by the 
45. See Sunita Lough, Comm'r of the Tax Exempt & Gov't Entities Div., Internal Revenue Serv., 
Ernst & Young Webcast (Oct. 11, 2017), in EO TAX J. 2017-219 (2017); U.S. Gov'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GA0-15-164, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: BETTER COMPLIANCE 
INDICATORS AND DATA, AND MORE COLLABORATION WITH STATE REGULATORS WOULD 
STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 18 (2014) (describing use of Form 990 
data to identify organizations for examination). 
46. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6033(a)(l), (a)(3) (2012); 26 C.F.R. §§ l.6033-2(a)(l), (g)(l) (2018); 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF ORGANIZATION 
EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 4 (2018) [hereinafter IRS 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-dft/i990--dft.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM98-PYNP]. 
47. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK 2018 4 (2018) [hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV. DATA BOOK), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/18databk.pdf [https://perma.cc/36UL-24XX]. 
48. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., TABLE 1, DOMESTIC PRIVATE 
FOUNDATIONS: NUMBER AND SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA, BY TYPE OF FOUNDATION AND SIZE OF 
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF TOTAL ASSETS, TAX YEAR 2015 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/l5pft)lta.xls [https://perma.cc/6BY3-97NH] (Forms 990-PF); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 
STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., TABLE 2, FORM 990 RETURNS OF 50l(C)(3)-(9) ORGANIZATIONS:. 
TOTAL FUNCTIONAL EXPENSES, BY CODE SECTION, TAX YEAR 2015 (2018), 
https:/ /www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15eo02.xlsx [https://perma.cc/D6BL-RQCQ]; INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV. STATISTICS OF INCOME DIV., TABLE 4, FORM 990-EZ RETURNS OF 501(C)(3)-(9) 
ORGANIZATIONS: SELECTED ITEMS, BY CODE SECTION, TAX YEAR 2015 (2018), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15eo04.xlsx (https://perma.cc/H8WB-E68L]. 
49. See IRS, Form 990 Series, supra note 42 (stating that the Form 990-N filing threshold is no 
more than $50,000 in annual gross receipts, on average); Natasha M. Cavanaugh et al., 
Recommendations Regarding Incentivizing Universal £-Filing for Form 990, in ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES 2018 REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
37, 42 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4344.pdf (https://perma.cc/EN49-46WY] (stating 
there were more than 600,000 Forms 990-N filed in fiscal year 2017). 
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applicants regarding their future plans, rather than reporting on their 
already completed financial transactions and other activities, as is 
reflected in the annual information returns. Perhaps for this reason, it is 
unclear if TE/GE has included information from those applications in the 
data it is subjecting to Big Data methods. 
The contents of these annual information returns represent a 
substantial amount of data. The Form 990 asks over 200 questions. 50 The 
form also has sixteen schedules that a tax-exempt nonprofit may need to 
complete depending on its specific activities. 51 Nevertheless, there are 
several reasons to question whether those data actually constitute a "Big 
Data" dataset as the term is commonly used. 
First, the volume of data accumulated annually is likely no more than 
a couple of terabytes, given that the annual amount of data from all 
federal tax returns-now approaching 250 million, including almost 190 
million income tax returns-is in the low double-digits of terabytes.52 Of 
course, this does not take into account the possibility that TE/GE is also 
pulling information from other tax filings-like individual income tax 
returns of executives at tax-exempt nonprofits-as part of its data 
collection efforts, although there are no public indications that this is 
currently the case. Second, the velocity of these data's accumulation is 
relatively slow because the annual information returns are not due for 
four and one-half months after the end of the relevant tax year and, by 
requesting an automatically granted six-month extension, a nonprofit can 
push that due date until almost a year after the end of the relevant tax 
year. 53 In addition, while the proportion of Forms 990, 990-EZ, and 990-
PF filed electronically has steadily risen in recent years, there are still a 
significant number that are filed in hard copy. As a result, adding this 
information to the IRS' s electronic database is further delayed. 54 Third, 
and finally, there is limited variety; most of the data are "structured" in 
50. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2018 FORM 990, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdfl'f990.pdf 
(https ://perma.ccN2CK-KUZB]. 
51. See id. 
52. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK, supra note 47, at 4 (stating the number of 
returns filed with the IRS for fiscal years 2016 and 2017); Lai, supra note 29 (noting that data from 
one year's worth of tax returns are fifteen to twenty terabytes ). 
53. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., FORM 8868 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f8868.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKS9-XS2F]. The extension is not available for nonprofits 
planning to file a Form 990-N. Id. at 2. 
54. See Cavanaugh et al., supra note 49, at 39 (discussing how "roughly 57 percent of all Forms 990 and 
990-EZ were filed electronically'' for fiscal year 2017); IRS 990 E-Filer Database, GrrHUB, 
https:/ / github.com/Nonprofit-Open-Data-Collective/irs-990-efiler-database [httpsJ /perma.cc/3QLL-XLA9] 
(stating that approximately 60,000 Forms 990-PF were filed electronically for calendar year 2016). 
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that they track the fields used in the 990 series forms, although the forms 
do have some questions that require more unstructured, narrative 
responses.55 And unlike the more general IRS data collection efforts, it is 
not clear that TE/GE is currently collecting a significant amount of data 
from sources other than IRS filings by tax-exempt nonprofits.56 
It also remains unknown whether the IRS is deploying machine 
learning techniques to analyze the data, as opposed to human-developed 
and fixed algorithms. That is not to say that machine learning is 
necessarily required to analyze every dataset effectively, but to the 
extent Big Data methods might be fruitful, it is uncertain whether the 
IRS has begun deploying them in this area, buzzwords 
notwithstanding. 57 By comparison, as early as 2004 the IRS Statistics of 
Income Division published a research paper describing its use of a 
"Support Vector Machine" algorithm that learned over time how to 
better recognize indicators of tax abuse in business and individual 
returns.58 
So TE/GE may not yet be truly using a "Big Data" approach to 
regulate tax-exempt nonprofits. However, given the use of a Big Data 
approach by the broader IRS, it likely is only a matter of time before 
TE/GE begins using the same methods-including harvesting significant 
amounts of data from sources beyond IRS filings and deploying machine 
learning techniques for analysis purposes. This application would be 
consistent with the IRS's increasing reliance on Big Data, broadly; one 
commentator predicts that over the next twenty-five years, the IRS likely 
will substantially increase its gathering of information from sources 
beyond IRS filings in order to reduce the compliance burden on 
taxpayers and the compliance gap in terms of owed but unpaid taxes.59 
Other commentators have noted that there are various indications the 
IRS is already gathering outside data, including the agency's purchase of 
cell phone tracking technology,60 its disclosure in response to a Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) request that it had been reading taxpayers' 
private emails without a warrant,61 and its disclosure in response to 
55. See supra notes 46 and 50. 
56. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing general IRS external data collection). 
57. See, e.g., HORTON & CHOI, supra note 43, at 5 (mentioning only "compliance models," risk 
identification, and collaboration with RAAS). 
58. DeBarr & Harwood, supra note 27, at 178. 
59. Michael Hatfield, Taxation and Surveillance: An Agenda, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 319, 340 
(2015). 
60. Houser & Sanders, supra note 28, at 822. 
61. Id. at 823 (noting that the IRS apparently ended this practice after congressional scrutiny). 
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another FOIA request that it collects information from social media sites 
such as Facebook using automated "spiders."62 Given sufficient time and 
resources, these same techniques could be applied to tax-exempt 
nonprofits, and also to individuals and other entities associated with 
them. While tax-exempt nonprofits generally do not owe income taxes, 
in exchange for the tax benefits they enjoy they may be subject to a 
number of legal restrictions that the IRS is required to enforce, including 
a reasonableness requirement for financial transactions with insiders, a 
more general prohibition on undue private benefit, and limitations on 
lobbying and election-related activities.63 
Furthermore, Congress recently enacted legislation that mandates 
electronic filing for all required annual retums. 64 Previously only 
relatively large tax-exempt nonprofits were required to file the Form 990 
electronically, although the Form 990-N filed by relatively small tax-
exempt nonprofits must be filed electronically.65 A broader e-filing 
requirement will marginally increase the velocity of the data from annual 
returns. It also will increase public access to this information, as detailed 
later in this Part. There has been significant government and nonprofit 
support for this broader requirement, including from the Advisory 
Committee for TE/GE.66 
62. Id. at 823-24. 
63. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2) (2012) (regarding conditions relating to the ability to receive tax-
deductible charitable contributions), 26 U.S.C. § 50l(c) (regarding conditions relating to exemption 
from income taxes), 26 U.S.C. § 4911-4912 (regarding excise taxes imposed because of excessive 
lobbying by charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits), § 4940-4946 (regarding restrictions on private 
foundations, a subset of charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits), § 4955 (regarding excise taxes imposed 
because of election-related activities by charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits), § 4958 (regarding excise 
taxes on "excess benefit transactions" between certain tax-exempt nonprofits and insiders). 
64. Taxpayer First Act of 2019, H.R. 3151, 116th Cong.§ 3101 (2019). Previous, failed attempts 
to require electronic filing included Retirement, Savings, and Other Tax Relief Act of 2018, H.R. 
88, 115th Cong. § 3101 (Rules Committee Print 115-85, Text of the House Amendment to the 
Senate Amendment to H.R. 88, 2018); H.R. 5443, 115th Cong. § 1 (2018); H.R. 1, 114th Cong. 
§ 6004 (2014). 
65. See Cavanaugh et al., supra note 49, at 42 (stating total assets of $10 million or more and that 
file at least 250 returns, such as wage reporting Form W-2, annually). 
66. See id. at 39 (Advisory Committee support); Lloyd H. Mayer, "The Better Part of Valour is 
Discretion": Should the IRS Change or Surrender Its Oversight of Tax-Exempt Organizations?, 7 
COLUM. J. TAX L. 80, 111-12, 111 n.212 (2016) (adding other support); U.S. Gov'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 45, at 34-36, 41 (recommending Congress consider 
expanding required e-filing for tax-exempt organiz.ations). 
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B. State Regulators 
In addition to the oversight provided by the IRS, states also oversee 
the operations of certain nonprofits.67 More specifically, most states 
require certain "charitable" nonprofits to register and file regular reports 
with a state agency if they hold assets for charitable use or solicit 
donations from state residents.68 State law usually defines "charitable" 
broadly so as to encompass not only nonprofits that qualify as charities 
under federal tax law but also some other types of nonprofits. 69 Each 
state has its own specific requirements for such filings and its own 
processes for handling them-including whether electronic filing is 
required or even available. 70 There is relatively limited information 
sharing between the states and between the states and the IRS, although 
the states with filing requirements generally require filers to submit their 
IRS annual information returns to the state.71 Furthermore, in almost half 
the states, authority over charitable nonprofits is split between two state 
agencies. 72 Local jurisdictions may also have their own registration and 
reporting requirements for charitable nonprofits that solicit donations 
from their residents. 73 Finally, the tax treatment of nonprofits-for state 
67. See MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GoVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE 
LAW AND REGULATION 301-02 (2004); Lloyd H. Mayer, Fragmented Oversight of Nonprofits in the 
United States: Does it Work? Can it Work?, 91 CIB.-KENT L. REv. 937, 938-39 (2016). 
68. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 67, at 305-06, 315, 372-73 (discussing charitable assets, 
registration and reporting, and charitable solicitation, respectively). 
69. For an example of the breadth of state law definitions of "charitable," see Omo ATT'Y GEN., 
HANDBOOK FOR NONPROFITS: AN OPERATIONAL RESOURCE FOR BOARD MEMBERS OF CHARITABLE 
ORGANIZATIONS 8 (2015), https://ohio.gov/wps/wcm/connect/gov/c 1965cd 1-7b72-4c57-a090 
f88b9f257a2d/AGO_NonprofitHandbook.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CONVERT_TO=url&CACHEID 
=ROOTWORKSP ACE.Z l 8_Ml HGGIKONOJOOOQ09DDDDM3000-c ! 965cdl-7b72-4c57-a090-
f88b9f257a2d-mml 8ZE3 [https://perma.cc/HD5X-VPFN] (stating that nonprofits tax-exempt under 
both Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) and section 501(c)(4) are generally required to 
register under the Ohio Charitable Trust Act). 
70. CINDY M. Lorr ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, STATE REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT IN TIIE CHARITABLE 
SECTOR 14, 26 (20 I 6), https:/ /www.mban.org/research/publication/state-regulation-and-enforcement-charitable-
sector [https://penna.cc/GEK4-JLUP]. 
71. Id. 
72. CINDY M. Lorr ET AL., URBAN INSTIIUTE, BIFURCATION OF STATE REGULATION OF OiARITIES: DIVIDED 
REGULATORY AUTHORITY OVER CHA.RrrlEs AND h's IMPACT ON CHARITABLE SOLICITATION LAWS I (2018), 
https://www.mban.oqyresearchlpublication'bifurcation-state-regulation-<:harities(https:/lpenna.cc/2QSY-VPHA]. 
73. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA ATT'Y GEN., GUIDE FOR CHARITIES: BEST PRACTICES FOR 
NONPROFITS THAT OPERATE OR fuNDRAISE IN CALIFORNIA 73 (2019), 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/charities/publications/guide_for_charities.pdf 
(https://perma.cc/W44U-SPTP] ("Many local jurisdictions in California also require charitable 
organizations to obtain a license or permit before soliciting donations from residents and in public 
spaces."); Joseph W. Mead, Local Regulation of Charitable Solicitation, 5 J. PUB. & NONPROFIT 
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income taxes and also state sales tax and local property taxes-is usually 
handled by additional state or local agencies. 74 
According to a recent report from the Urban Institute, approximately 
half the states maintain a database of charitable nonprofits that register 
and report, which may include information from independent audited 
financial statements when state law requires the filing of those 
statements.75 In general, the more staff a state dedicates to oversight of 
charitable nonprofits the greater the likelihood that a state agency will 
maintain a database of registered nonprofits, whether only for internal 
use or also for public use. 76 However, the use by regulators of these 
databases appears to be limited to simple searches. For example, an 
official from California recently remarked that her office uses an 
algorithm to identify every charitable nonprofit that reports a self-
dealing transaction on its state filings. 77 This is a very basic search as it 
only requires determining which organizations have answered "yes" to a 
single question on the required annual report. As is the case with the 
IRS, state regulators are interested in ensuring that nonprofits, 
particularly charitable nonprofits, comply with their legal obligations. 
Under state law, those obligations include: ensuring assets remain 
dedicated to the nonprofit's stated purposes; limiting transactions with 
insiders to reasonable amounts; complying with registration, reporting, 
and other requirements associated with charitable solicitation; and, for 
nonprofit leaders, otherwise fulfilling their fiduciary duties. 78 
State regulators hope, however, to increase their collection of data 
regarding charitable nonprofits and their ability to use those data. The 
primary vehicle for these efforts is the "Single Portal Initiative," which 
aims to create a single website where nonprofits can register with and 
report to multiple jurisdictions, reducing the compliance burden on the 
organizations and facilitating access to the registration and reporting 
A.FF. 178 (2019) (surveying charitable solicitation regulations imposed by 49 of the 50 largest cities 
in the United States). 
74. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 67, at 368-70; FRANCES R. HILL & BARBARA L. 
KlRSCHTEN, FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, at 14-4, 14-5 (1994 & 
Supp. 1996); Evelyn Brody, All Charities are Property-Tax Exempt, but Some Charities are More 
Exempt than Others, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 621, 625, 671-732 (2010); Mark J. Cowan, Nonprofit 
and the Sales and Use Tax, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 1077, 1205--45 (2010). 
75. LoTT ET AL., supra note 70, at 14-15. 
76. Id. at 25-26. 
77. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 5233 (2018) (defining self-dealing transaction); Tania Ibanez, 
Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the TE/GE Joint Councils (February 22, 2018), in EO TAX J. 
2018-97 (2018). 
78. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 67, at 305--06, 370; LoTT ET AL., supra note 70, at 1-2. 
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information for all of the states involved. 79 While this project has been 
on the drawing board for many years, it recently gained new momentum 
with the retention of two private vendors to implement the project, and a 
recent announcement included plans to fully launch it by the end of 
2018.80 However, as of January 2019, it was only active in a pilot phase 
for two states.81 State officials also hope to take advantage of increased 
access to newly released IRS electronic data regarding tax-exempt 
nonprofits, as detailed below. 82 
C. Nonprofits and the Public 
There is an important aspect of the information collected by 
government regulators regarding nonprofits: theoretically, information 
relating to nonprofits is also available to nonprofits generally and the 
public. Furthermore, in practice this information is increasingly available 
in an easily accessible manner thanks to the efforts of various private 
actors. This access enables not only potential donors, members, 
customers, volunteers, and employees to learn more about the particular 
nonprofits of interest to them, and nonprofits to learn more about other 
nonprofits, but also permits academic researchers and journalists to 
access and analyze information about these organizations. In this 
respect, this information is similar to the data collected by some other 
federal agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency, the 
Federal Election Commission, and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, in that they are available to the stakeholders, the public, 
and researchers. 83 
The rationale for public disclosure of information related to tax-
exempt nonprofit organizations is that it enables the public to ensure that 
79. See MRFP, INC., supra note 11. 
80. See GUIDESTAR, Press Release, supra note I I. 
81. See MFRP ET AL., SINGLEPORTAL.ORG: STATE CHARITY REGISTRATION PORTAL, 
https://www.nasconet.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/SinglePortal_ OneSheets-Organizer_ v I. pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QKN9-QT2U]. 
82. Cindy M. Lott, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the TE/GE Joint Councils (Feb. 22, 2018), 
in EOTAXJ. 2018-96 (2018). 
83. See METHODS, MODELS, TOOLS, AND DATABASES, ENvlRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epagov/research/methods-models-tools-and-databases [https://perma.cc/QHP2-4HG1]; 
DISCLOSURE DATA CATALOG, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMlSS!ON, https://classic.fec.gov/data/DataCatalog.do 
[https://perma.cc/V695-l.52G]; EDGAR, SEARCH TOOLS, SECURITIES & EXCHANGE CoMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htm [https://perrna.cc/9FV4-FWVW]; Rachael E. Salcido, 
Reviving the Environmental Justice Agenda, 91 CHI.-KENT L REv. 115, 128 (2016) (discussing data made 
available by the EPA). 
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these nonprofits deserve the significant tax benefits that they enjoy.84 A 
related rationale is that by claiming benefits, nonprofits voluntarily 
surrender any right to privacy they may have pertaining to information 
they must then provide to the IRS. 85 Similar considerations presumably 
are the basis for required public disclosure at the state level relating to 
charitable nonprofits. 86 While concerns over privacy and potential 
misuse of disclosed information argue against disclosure, in the context 
of nonprofits, commentators have found them easily outweighed by 
these rationales, except possibly when they involve information relating 
to particular individuals. 87 
More specifically, federal law requires both the IRS and tax-exempt 
nonprofits to allow any member of the public to access applications for 
recognition of exemption and recent annual information returns. 88 
Requesting information on an organization-by-organization basis may be 
sufficient for an individual donor interested in a limited number of 
nonprofits or a journalist working on a story relating to a specific group. 
However, an organization-by-organization approach would not be very 
practical for a researcher attempting to develop a broader database of 
information about such entities. On its website, the IRS provides a 
search tool to confirm the tax-exempt and charitable, if applicable, status 
of a given nonprofit and makes certain collected information available 
for downloading but with limited ease ofuse.89 
Several private organizations have successfully worked with-and in 
one case filed a lawsuit against-the IRS to gain broader access to this 
information and, to the extent possible, in machine-readable format. 90 
84. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, STUDY OF PREsENr-lAW TAXPAYER CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCWSURE 
PROVISIONS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 3802 OF TI-IE INIERNAL REvENuE SERVICE REsrRUCTIJRING AND REroRM 
ACT OF 1998, VOLUME II: SlUDY OF DISCl.OSURE PROVISIONS RELATING 10 TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 5----6, 
63 (2000~ https://wwwjct.gov/publications.html?fimc=startdown&id=2559 [https://penna.cc'JN2P-RJQ7]. 
However, it remains tlllclear whetlJ.er public disclosure actually increases legal compliance by nooprofits. See Lloyd 
H. Mayer, Nonprofits, Politics, and Privacy, 62 CASE W. RFs. L REV. 801, 822 n.97 (2012). 
85. Mayer, supra note 84, at 821. 
86. See Hugh R. Jones, The Importance of Transparency in the Governmental Regulation of the 
Nonprofit Sector: Room for Improvement?, COLUMBIA I ACAD. COMMONS 2-3, 10-11 (2013), 
https:/ /academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10. 7916/D86H4 FG7 [https://perma.cc/L8ZM-FULK]. 
87. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 84, at 62---64; Mayer, supra note 84, at 821-23, 828---29. 
88. See 26 U.S.C. § 6104 (2012); 26 C.F.R. §§ 301.6104(a)-1,(d)-l (2018). 
89. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., SOI TAX STATS - CHARITIES & OTHER TAX-EXEMPT 
ORG ANIZA TIO NS ST A TISTICS, https://www.irs.gov/ statistics/soi-tax-stats-charities-and-other-tax-
exempt-organizati ons-stati sti cs [https://perma.cc/8XKM-XPZX]; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATION SEARCH, https:/ /www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/tax-exempt-
organization-search [https:/ /perma.cc/40D5-ZRSY]. 
90. Machine-readable simply means that that the data is in a format that can be automatically read 
and processed by a computer. See OPEN DATA HANDBOOK, GLOSSARY: MACHINE READABLE, 
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These efforts are part of the larger "open data" movement, which strives 
to get governments to release information proactively in order to 
facilitate accountability, transparency, and private-public collaboration.91 
The first group providing broader access was the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS), originally housed in the national nonprofit 
umbrella organization Independent Sector in the 1980s, but then 
transferred in the mid-l 990s to its current home at the Urban Institute, 
itself a charitable nonprofit.92 NCCS has developed and made publicly 
available a number of nonprofit databases, based in large part of 
information obtained from the IRS. NCCS manages collections made 
available by the IRS: the IRS Exempt Organization Business Master 
Files contains basic information for all active and filing tax-exempt 
nonprofits for 1989 and 1995-2016, and the IRS Statistics of Income 
Sample Data Files contains information from a sample of Forms 990 and 
990-EZ for 1982-1983 and 1985-2012.93 Additionally, NCCS has 
developed databases containing selected information from all Forms 
990, 990-EZ, and 990-PF for 1989-2015.94 Working with the IRS, 
NCCS also developed a categorization system for nonprofits known as 
the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE).95 NCCS designed 
its databases primarily by use for researchers, although it is in the 
process of developing a new data platform that will provide easier access 
for non-experts.96 
The second group to come on the scene, but likely the most well-
known, is GuideStar, founded in the mid-l 990s and itself a charitable 
http://opendatahandbook.org/glossary/en/terms/machine-readable/ [https://perma.cc/9FKZ-B7MH]. 
For information about the lawsuit, see infra note 107 and accompanying text. 
91. See generally Beth S. Noveck, Rights-Based and Tech-Driven: Open Data, Freedom of 
Information, and the Future of Government Transparency, 19 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. I 
(2017) ( describing the open data movement). 
92. See WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., lHE CHARITABLE NONPROFITS: AN ANALYSIS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
DYNAMICS AND CHARACTERISTICS 32 n.2 (1994); About Us, INDEPENDENTSECTORORG, 
httpsJ/independentsector.org/about-us/ [httpsJ/pennacc/4B36-TUZG ] (descnbing Independent Sector as 
"the only national membership organization that brings together the charitable community . . . to advance the 
common good"); Featured Projects, NCCS DATA ARCHJVE, httpsJ/nccs.utban.org/ [httpsJ/permacc/KQW9-
EUW2] (identifying NCCS as now part of the Urban Institute). 
93. National Center for Charitable Statistics Data Archive, NCCS DATA ARCHIVE, https://nccs-
data.urban.org/index.php [https://perma.cc/9RA5-3wx4]. 
94. Id. 
95. National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) Codes, NCCS DATA ARCHIVE, 
http://nccs.urban.org/classification/national-taxonomy-exempt-entities [https://perma.cc/P3HC-59DB]. 
96. Nonprofit Data at Your Fingertips, NCCS DATA ARCHIVE, http://nccs.urban.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/C5XK-7RNS]. 
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nonprofit.97 Unlike NCCS, its target audience is the public generally, 
including nonprofit leaders, donors, and journalists; like NCCS it also 
relies primarily on information obtained from the IRS, although it also 
gathers additional information from the nonprofits themselves and other 
sources.98 GuideStar has developed a reputation as a source for 
information about nonprofits because of the breadth of its coverage and 
its user friendly website.99 GuideStar also receives approximately 350 
variables from Form 990 financial data from the NCCS. 100 It only 
recently announced that it will merge with the Foundation Center, which 
collects information on grants, to further enhance its database. 101 In 
order to finance its operations, however, it requires payment for some 
search and analysis tools, downloading options, data services, reports, 
and older information. 102 
The most recent entry into this space is ProPublica, a charitable 
nonprofit that focuses on investigative journalism. 103 It launched its 
Nonprofit Explorer website earlier this decade and has continually 
updated it since that time. 104 The website provides a search engine to 
access IRS information, including Form 990s, for any given tax-exempt 
nonprofit beginnirlg with 2013, along with certain federal grant audit 
97. GuideStar: A Brief History, GUIDESTAR, https://learn.guidestar.org/about-us/history 
[https://perma.cc/W86V-92YQ]. 
98. See Hi! We 're GuideStar, GUIDESTAR, https://leam.guidestar.org/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/5HCP-G8ER] (data sources described under "What We Do"). 
99. See GuideStar: A Brief History, GUIDESTAR, supra note 97 (noting that Forms 990 and 990-
EZ were first posted in 1999; Form 990-PF in 2000; and the database was expanded to include all 
tax-exempt organizations in 2005). 
100. Getting Started with NCCS Data, NCCS DATA ARCHIVE, 
http://nccs.urban.org/database/overview-nccs-data-files [https://perma.cc/5AE8-MW9Y] (describing 
NCCS-GuideStar National Nonprofit Research Database); GUIDE TO USING NCCS DATA, NAT'L 
CTR. FOR CHARITABLE STATISTICS 3, https://nccs-data.urban.org/NCCS-data-guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XKP7-VQZS]. 
101. See Marc Gunther, 2 Information Giants, Foundation Center and GuideStar, to Join Forces, 
THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY (Feb. 5, 2019), https://philanthropy.com/article/2-Information-
Giants/245608 [https://perma.cc/N7Z5-EKZS]; Press Release, Foundation Ctr., Foundation Center 
and GuideStar Join Forces to Become a New Nonprofit Entity Named Candid (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://foundationcenter.org/about-us/press-room/archive/foundation-center-and-guidestar-join-
forces-to-become-a-new-nonprofit-entity-named-candid [https://perma.cc/ED32-68XU]. 
102. See GuideStar Products & Services, GUIDESTAR, https://leam.guidestar.org/products/ 
[https://perma.cc/ W86V-92YQ]. 
103. See The Mission, About Us, PROPuBLICA, https://www.propublica.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/QSF7-XYGK]. 
104. See Mike Tigas, Announcing the Nonprofit Explorer AP/, PROPuBLICA (Sept. 26, 2013, 
10:20 AM), https://www.propublica.org/nerds/announcing-the-nonprofit-explorer-api 
[https://perma.cc/X9DR-WM27]. 
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information since 2016. 105 It also provides an application-programming 
interface that allows more robust searches. 106 
This machine-readable data became public in 2017 when an open data 
promoting organization challenged the IRS. 107 While the organization 
only sought access to machine-readable data from the annual 
information returns filed by certain tax-exempt nonprofits, in the wake 
of a federal trial court ruling against it, the IRS decided to publicly 
release the machine-readable data for all e-filed annual information 
returns from 2011 forward as an Amazon Web Services public 
dataset. 108 Congress also recently codified a requirement that the IRS 
release these data in machine-readable form. 109 Finally, there have been 
some efforts to create more specialized databases of nonprofit 
information. For example, a Vermont nonprofit launched a database 
focused on nonprofits from that state. 110 
As the introduction to this Part indicates, the mere release of data 
does not mean that those data are immediately usable by researchers and 
others. It is taking a concerted effort by a number of academics and 
private organizations working together as the Nonprofit Open Data 
Collective to clean up those data in order to make them usable. 111 For 
105. See Nonprofit Explorer, PROPuBLICA, https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/ 
[https://perma.cc/X3D3-J42S] (referencing the "About This Data" section). 
106. Id. 
107. See Public Resource.org v. IRS, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 1263 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Alec 
Glassford, Nonprofit Explorer Update: Full Text of 1.9 Million Records, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 10, 
2017, 11 :38 AM), https://www.propublica.org/nerds/nonprofit-explorer-update-full-text-of-nearly-
two-million-records [https://perma.cc/53GG-X3RJ]. 
108. See id.; IRS 990 Filing Data Now Available as an AWS Public Data Set, AMAzON WEB 
SERVICES: AWS Gov'T, Eouc., & NONPROFITS BLOG (June 15, 2016), 
https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/publicsector/irs-990-filing-data-now-available-as-an-aws-public-
data-set/ [https://perma.cc/WS9G-KKPJ]; Suzanne Perry, JRS Plans to Begin Releasing Electronic 
Nonprofit Tax Forms Next Year, THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY (June 30, 2015), 
https:/ /www.philanthropy.com/article/IRS-Plans-to-Begin-Releasing/231265 
[https://perma.cc/UU6S-EZFM]. 
109. See Taxpayer First Act of 2019, H.R. 1957, I 16th Cong.§ 3101(c) (2019). 
110. See Andrea Suozzo, Explore the Organizations and People that Power Vermont's $6.8 
Bi/lion Nonprofit Economy, SEVEN DAYS: VERMONT NONPROFIT NAVIGATOR, 
https://nonprofits.sevendaysvt.com [https://perma.cc/U3UF-3WZG]; Matthew Roy, Seven Days 
Launches Vermont Nonprofit Navigator Database, SEVEN DAYS: OFF MESSAGE (June 28, 2018, 
4 :00 AM), https://www.sevendaysvt.com/OflMessage/archives/2018/06/28/seven-days-launches-
vermont-nonprofit-navigator-database [https://perma.cc/JKB5-F79W]. 
111. See How the Nonprofit Open Data Collective Came Together to Work on IRS 990 Data in 
the Cloud, AMAZON WEB SERVICES: AWS Gov'T, EDUC., & NONPROFITS BLOG (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/publicsector/how-the-nonprofit-open-data-collective-came-together-
to-work-on-irs-990-data-in-the-cloud/ [https://perma.cc/3PEX-69HZ]; Stephanie Roman, The Aspen 
Institute 's Program on Philanthropy and Social innovation (PSI) Hosts Nonprofit Datathon, ASPEN 
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example, the dataset reflected dozens of different electronic formats for 
the Form 990 over the time period at issue, which had to be reconciled 
sufficiently to allow for meaningful analysis of those data in the 
aggregate. 112 The cleaned up data are now available on GitHub, an 
online platform recently purchased by Microsoft. 113 These data represent 
a major increase in the computerized data available from the Form 990, 
since it includes thousands of fields as compared to the hundreds of 
fields previously digitized by the NCCS. 114 Cleaning work is continuing 
on the initially released data, and will have to continue indefinitely as 
the IRS continues to release data from newly filed annual information 
returns. But these data only reflect e-filed returns, and so currently 
provide only a partial picture of Form 990, Form 990-EZ, and Form 990-
PF filers. 115 
Nonprofits and the public also have access to the state databases for 
charitable nonprofits in some states, although the extent of access 
varies. 116 It appears that public access comes with, at most, simple 
search capabilities that, while perhaps sufficient to locate information 
regarding a particular charitable nonprofit, do not facilitate consideration 
of the data in the aggregate. 117 Finally, a variety of private organizations, 
including watchdog groups such as Charity Navigator and the Better 
Business Bureau's Wise Giving Alliance and umbrella organizations 
such as the Foundation Center, have complied their own databases and 
analyses of selected nonprofits drawing from a range of available 
INSTITUTE (June 6, 2017), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/aspen-institutes-program-
philanthropy-social-innovation-psi-hosts-nonprofit-datathon/ [https://perma.cc/K986-NYT9]. 
112. Roman, supra note 111. 
113. See Nonprofit Open Data Collective, supra note 54; Microsoft completes 
acquisition, OFFICIAL MICROSOFT BLOG (Oct. 26, 
https :/ lb logs.mi crosoft. com/b log/2018/1 0/26/microsoft-comp letes-gi thub-acquisition/ 
[https:/ /perma.cc/ECP5-65Z7]. 
114. See supra notes 93, 100 and accompanying text. 
GitHub 
2018), 
115. See Nonprofit Open Data Collective, supra note 54 (referencing the "IRS 990 E-Filer Data" 
section). 
116. Lorr ET AL., supra note 70, at 25. 
117. See, e.g., Registry Verification Search, STATE OF CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE: OFF. OF THE ATT'Y GEN., 
http) /rctdoj .ca.govN erification/W eb/Search.aspx?fucility= Y [httpsJ /perma.cc/C9W7-PKBN] ( stating the 
search tool is designed to obtain information with respect to a particular charitable organization or fimdraiser); 
Charitable Trust Database Search, ILL. Arr'Y GEN., httpJ/charitableviewer.ilattomeygeneral.net/ 
[httpsJ/perma.cc/QY 4K-8V6U] (stating that the database provides financial information about individual 
charities); Welcome to the Chan'ties Bureau Registry Search, CHARITIEsNYS.COM, NEW YORK STATE 
OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., httpsJ/www.charitiesnys.com/RegistrySearch/search_charities.jsp 
[httpsJ/perma.cc/527N-6CAK] (stating the search tool is designed to search for a specific organization). 
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sources, but these databases tend to be relatively limited in scope, 
accessibility, and searchability. 118 
These government-related efforts do not reflect the only potential use 
of Big Data approaches by nonprofits, of course. For example, the 
consulting firm M+R offers a variety of Big Data-related services to 
nonprofits, promoted in part through its annual Benchmarks Study. 119 Its 
most recent Benchmarks Study focused on over five billion digital 
interactions with supporters of 154 participating nonprofitsY0 However, 
these purely private efforts do not relate directly to government use of 
Big Data to regulate nonprofits. They also do not make information 
available to the public, except either in aggregate form or with the 
consent of the particular nonprofit involved. They are therefore not the 
focus of this Article. 
D. Other Countries 
Before considering how trends in the collection and analysis of data 
regarding nonprofits in the United States may benefit or hurt the 
oversight of the nonprofit sector here, it is worth noting that in most 
other countries government regulators are also moving in a similar 
direction. The Canada Revenue Agency is expected to begin using Big 
Data methods to analyze its nonprofit database in the near future. 121 
Since 2013, the agency has made all of its datasets dating from 2000 
forward available through the government's data portal. 122 The Charity 
Commission for England and Wales similarly provides the public with 
I 18. See, e.g., Which Charity Report Are You Looking For?, BBB WISE GIVING ALLIANCE, 
https://www.give.org/ [https://perma.cc/4M5V-PHJ3] (allowing searches by charity name); 
Advanced Search, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, 
https://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfi:n?bay=search.advanced [https://perma.cc/PQ7V-GMHY] 
(allowing searches by a limited set of criteria); 990 Finder, FOUNDATION CENTER, 
https://foundationcenter.org/find-funding/990-finder [https://perma.cc/NDR6-G7KB] (same). 
119. See Services, M+R, https://www.mrss.com/work/ [https://perma.cc/WDV4-UAFS]; M+R, 
The 2019 Benchmarks will be mind-boggling. Join us for the journey!, M+R BLOG (Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://www.mrss.com/lab/the-2019-benchmarks-will-be-mind-boggling-join-us-for-the-joumey/ 
[https://perma.cc/YZR2-UWGU]. 
120. M+R, BENCHMARKS 2018, 
https:/ /namp .ameri cansforthearts. org/ sites/ default/files/2018 _Benchmarks_S tudy. pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S6E7-Y8DX]. 
121. See C. Yvonne Chenier, CRA and the Champ, DRAKE APTOWITZER LLP, (Sept. 14, 2017), 
http://drache.ca/articles/cra-and-the-champ/ [https://perma.cc/844A-69WY]. 
122. JULIET MCMURREN ET AL., OPEN DATA'S IMPACT: OPENING CANADA'S T3010 CHARITY 
INFORMATION RETURN DATA: ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITIES THROUGH OPEN DATA 3 (2016), 
http://odimpact.org/case-opening-canadas-t30 I 0-charity-information-retum-data.html 
[https://perma.cc/KZG3-SRE3]. 
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the ability to electronically extract the data from its registry of charities 
for all registered charities. 123 The Australian Charities and Not-for-
Profits Commission recently made available the information submitted 
by charities in that country on their 2015 Annual Information 
Statements. 124 The New Zealand Charities Services agency provides a 
robust search engine and the ability to download data in mass on its 
website. 125 The charity regulators in Ireland and Scotland also allow 
public, online access to their charity registers. 126 It appears that access is 
limited to only the most basic facts regarding registered charities, as 
opposed to the entirety of the information filed by those charities. 127 But 
in Ireland, a private partner has stepped up to create a more robust, 
publicly available database of information for nonprofit organizations in 
that country, similar to what has happened in the United States. 128 This 
incomplete list only provides a sample of the data available outside the 
United States, as there are other private and government databases. 129 
These developments indicate that while the United States may be at or 
close to the leading edge of the Big Data approach to information 
regarding nonprofits, it is far from alone in moving in this direction. This 
is particularly true because, as will be seen, most aspects of both the 
promises and perils are not country-dependent but apply universally. The 
one maJor exception is legal limits, which of course are country-
dependent. 
123. See Registered Charities in England and Wales: Data/or Registered and Removed Charities 
in England and Wales, CHARITY COMMISSION, http://data.charitycommission.gov.uk/data-
definition.aspx [https://perma.cc/NQG4-U2FF]. 
124. See New Charity Data Available on Data.gov.au, AUSTRALIAN CHARITIES AND NOT-FOR-
PROFITS COMMISSION: NEWS (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.acnc.gov.au/media/news/new-charity-
data-available-datagovau [https:/ /perma.cc/8E48-V8A2]. 
125. See The Charities Register, CHARITIES SERVICES, https://www.charities.govt.nz/charities-in-
new-zealand/the-charities-register/ [https://perma.ccff7QZ-UDFF]. 
126. See Information for the Public, CHARITIES REGULATOR, 
httpJ/www.charitiesreguJatoryauthority.ie/en/CRA/Pages/WPl 6000072 [httpsJ/perma.cc/S4B5-S88Z]; 
Charity Register Download, ScoTTISH CHARITY REGULATOR, httpsJ/www.oscr.org.uk/about-
charities/search-the-register/charity-register-<lownload [httpsJ /perma.cc/S85U--64T6]. 
127. See supra note 26. 
128. See What is Benefacts?, BENEFACTS, httpsJ/en.benefucts.ie/about/what-is-benefucts/ 
[httpsJ/permacc/QBM2-K57F]; Patricia Quinn, Bene/acts: Building a Data Infrastructure to Support Public 
Policy for Nonprofits in Ireland (2018) (unpublished manuscript) ( on file with author). 
129. See, e.g., 1i-IE CHARITY VAULT, httpsJ/web.archive.orglweb/20180224033949/httpJ/charity-
charities.orgl [httpsJ/perma.cc/GKS7-N6XN] (referencing a private directory of more than 100,000 organizations 
around the world); lsRAEL GivEs, httpsJ/www.israelgives.org/pages/mdex [httpsJ/perrna.cc/QW7B-YSBG] 
(referencing a private database of"all of Israel's 42,000 non-profits and charities''). 
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The promises of Big Data are based on the technology-driven growth 
in the amount of data collected electronically, particularly through the 
Internet, and the technology-enabled development of advanced analytics 
to analyze those data in order "to uncover patterns, correlations, 
anomalies, outliers, and other insights not suggested by a priori 
hypotheses or explicit assumptions" that can then be used to improve 
actions or decisions. 130 In the context of government regulation, the 
potential exists both to more efficiently enforce existing laws and to 
better design rules to achieve desired outcomes. 131 For example, in 2011, 
New York City launched a new data-based system for determining what 
buildings to inspect for "illegal conversions" --dividing up a property so 
it can house many more people that it was designed to do so safely-and 
overnight inspector visits found unsafe conditions meriting orders to 
vacate in over 70% of cases as opposed to the previous rate of 13%.132 In 
addition, to the extent government collected data are made available to 
the public, that availability could increase government accountability 
and transparency, spur private research that aids government goals, and 
provide improved information to the public. 133 This Part addresses 
whether and to what extent these benefits might be found in the context 
of government regulation of nonprofits. 
A. Improved Government Oversight 
The regulatory goal of the IRS and state agencies is to ensure 
compliance with the applicable laws in a fair manner. With respect to 
regulating nonprofits, this goal is easy to state, but difficult to 
implement. 134 This task is complicated by the very limited resources that 
130. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-16-659SP, DATA AND ANALYTICS 
INNOVATION: EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 11 (2016). 
131. See KITCHIN, supra note 17, at 115-16; MANYIKAET AL., supra note 5, at 61-62. 
132. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHl'.)NBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT 
WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 186--88 (2013 ). 
133. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
I 34. See Tax Exempt & Government Entities Division At-a-Glance, INTERNAL REvENuE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/govemment-entities/tax-exempt-govemment-entities-division-at-a-glance 
[https://permacc/4N3Y-2KPQ] ("Our mission is to provide our customers top quality service by helping you 
understand and comply with applicable tax laws and to protect the public interest by applying the tax law with 
integrity and fairness to all."); NATIONAL Assoc. OF ST. CHARITY OFFICIALS, https://www.nasconet.org/ 
[https://permacc/XH8W-NDEL] (an association of "state offices ... charged with oversight of charitable 
organizations and charitable solicitation in the United States''). 
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both the IRS and state regulators have available for regulating nonprofits 
in the United States compared to the number, financial size, and variety 
of these nonprofits. 135 These limited resources have, in turn, led to a 
federal audit rate of less than half-a-percent for the annual information 
returns filed by tax-exempt nonprofits. 136 No data is available regarding 
the overall level of enforcement activities by state regulators, but 
anecdotal evidence indicates a similarly low level of enforcement 
activity. 137 
In its most recent Work Plans, TE/GE has emphasized improving 
transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness, with the increased reliance 
on data-driven methods particularly related to the latter two goals. 138 For 
example, in 2016 TE/GE noted that testing case selection modeling 
techniques resulted in a change rate of 85% for closed audits, which 
appears to mean that in 85% of cases, the IRS successfully asserted that 
the filing organization had to change its activities or reporting. 139 More 
recent information released by the IRS indicated a change rate of slightly 
over 80%, which exceeds the IRS' s usual target. 140 Increased change 
rates for audits would indicate improvements to efficiency-the greater 
the proportion of audits that result in changes, the more efficient the 
audit selection process is, as agents are not wasting their time and the 
audited organization's time by checking organizations that are in full 
compliance with the law. Increased change rates would also indicate 
improvements to effectiveness, because a higher change rate indicates 
that fewer legal violations are going undetected and uncorrected. 
135. See LOTT ET AL., supra note 70, at 8; Mayer, supra note 66, at 83. 
136. Mayer, supra note 66, at 91. 
137. See SHIRLEY ADELSTEIN & ELIZABETH T. BORIS, STATE REGULATION OF THE CHARITABLE 
SECTOR: ENFORCEMENT, OUTREACH, STRUCTURE, AND STAFFING 2 (2018), 
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/state-regulation-charitable-sector 
[https://perma.cc/2A2G-KYPF]; Mayer, supra note 67, at 940. 
138. TE/GE, 2018, supra note 42, at 6-8; TAX EXEMPT AND GoVERNMENT ENTITIES (TE/GE), 
FY 2017 WORK PLAN 3-8 (2016) [hereinafter TE/GE, 2017], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/tege_fy2017 _ work_plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/KM5D-WRD2]. This parallels similar efforts in 
the broader IRS, driven in significant part by the need to maximize the use of limited resources. See 
Bulusu, supra note 28; Sony Kassam, IRS Catches $10 Billion in Tax Fraud in 2018, DAILY TAX 
REP., BLOOMBERG TAX (Nov. 14, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://news.bloombergtax.corn/daily-tax-
report/irs-catches-1O-billion-in-tax-fraud-in-2018-1 [https://perma.cc/J4FF-RC8C] ( crediting data 
analytics for a four-fold increase in the amount of tax fraud discovered). 
139. See TE/GE, 2017, supra note 138, at 6-7. A greater amount of data and a greater ability to 
use those data could also benefit efforts to design new rules for nonprofits. See Ruth Madrigal, 
Attorney-Advisor, Department of the Treasury, Remarks at the Urban Institute (Dec. 1, 2015), in 
EO TAX J. 2016-6 (Jan. 11, 2016). 
140. Von Lienen, supra note 44, at 7. 
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While touted primarily as a means of reducing the compliance burden 
on charitable nonprofits, the states' Single Portal initiative also holds the 
promise of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of state oversight 
by creating an electronic database of information that state regulators 
can use. 141 The states anticipate that the database will "maximize 
efficiency, data transparency, and information sharing," including by 
helping regulators connect Form 990 data and state registration data and 
by enabling them to use analytics "to better understand charitable 
resources and solicitations, to better focus law enforcement and fraud 
prevention resources, and [to] enable better policy making for protection 
of charitable resources."142 In other words, improved efficiency and 
effectiveness. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the promise of 
better government oversight is actually fulfilled by these technological 
developments. As for improved accountability and transparency, the 
regulators in this area are hindered by the need to not unduly tip their 
hand to potential bad actors. 143 That said, the data they have made 
available to outside researchers may also lead to improvements in this 
area. 
B. Improved Research 
Another often cited benefit of these Big Data moves relating to 
nonprofit organizations is greater access to information by academic 
researchers, who presumably in turn will conduct analyses that then aid 
policy makers and the public. 144 The Single Portal initiative is touted in 
part because "[a]cademics, policy makers and the public will be able to 
conduct their own inquiries or download data in machine-readable 
format." 145 The IRS has not specifically promoted this research benefit 
for the data it makes available, but the effect of its decision to release in 
machine-readable format all recent e-filed Forms 990, when combined 
with the efforts of private actors to clean those data to make them usable 
by researchers, has now made these data accessible for private 
research. 146 
141. See GUIDEST AR, Press Release, supra note 11. 
142. MRFP, INC., supra note 11. 
143. See Tai Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1512 (2013) ("The 
IRS maintains full secrecy as to the selective auditing schemes it applies"). 
144. See BETH s. NOVECK & DANJEL L. GoROFF, INFORMATION FOR IMPACT: LIBERATING NONPROm 
SECTOR DATA (2013), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/psi/psi_Information-
for-Impact.pdf[https://permacdX7X7-6QUX]. 
145. MRFP, INC., supra note 11. 
146. See supra notes 107-111 and accompanying text. 
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Recent work by Professors Brian Galle and Terri Helge hints at the 
potential of greater access to data about nonprofits. In two articles, Galle 
drew upon the private foundation data compiled by NCSS and other 
information to provide new analyses of (1) private foundation 
investment returns and their relationship to the rate of distributions to 
support current charitable activities, and (2) how differences in state law 
standing rules correlated with private foundation administrative cost 
ratios. 147 His research has important ramifications for the law relating to 
restricted gifts, particularly for the appropriate legally required 
distribution rate (the "payout" rate) for private foundations, and also for 
developments with respect to state standing law. Helge comprehensively 
reviewed all of the letters from IRS denying applicants for recognition of 
exemption as charities from 2004 through early 2017 to determine the 
grounds for denials and their relative frequency. 148 Her research is 
relevant to whether recent changes in the application process may result 
in a significant number of unqualified organizations nevertheless being 
recognized by the IRS as tax-exempt charities, and also may help 
identify the common pitfalls for such organizations when they are first 
starting out. While less directly applicable to legal compliance, 
researchers in other fields have also begun to take advantage of the 
increasing amount of available nonprofit data. For example, Professors 
Na than Grasse and Jesse Lecy and their co-authors have used nonprofit 
data to explore a variety of topics, including government grants to 
nonprofits and issues relating to nonprofit compensation. 149 Researchers 
in other countries are also exploring possible uses of nonprofit data 
newly available in their home countries. 150 
14 7. See Brian Galle, Valuing the Right to Sue: An Empirical Examination of Nonprofit Agency 
Costs, 60 J.L. & ECON. 413 (2017); Brian Galle, Pay It Forward? Law and the Problem of 
Restricted-Spending Philanthropy, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1143, 1143-44 (2016). 
148. Terri L. Helge, Rejecting Charity: Why the IRS Denies Tax Exemption to 50l(c)(3) 
Applicants, 14 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 3 (2016). 
149. See, e.g., Nathan Grasse et al., Understanding the Compensation of Nonprofit Executive 
Directors: Examining the Influence of Perfonnance and Organizational Characteristics, 24 
NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 377, 378 (2014) (using Form 990 data from the NCCS); Jesse 
Lecy & Jeremy Thornton, What Big Data Can Tell Us About Government Awards to the Nonprofit 
Sector: Using the FAADS, 45 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 1052, 1060-62 (2016) (same). 
150. See, e.g., Natasha Cortis, Linking Non-Profit Data Across Government: An Australian 
Example 2 (July 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (proposing linking data from 
the Australian Charities Non-for-profits Commission dataset to the Workplace Gender Equality 
Agency dataset to explore gender equality issues in the charity workforce of Australia); Megan 
LePere-Schloop et al., NGO Classification From the Bottom-Up: Using Self-Reported Data and 
Machine Leaming to Generate Categories of NGOs in Ghana 4 (July 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) (using digitized data from the annual reports of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) operating in Gahan to develop a database of these NGOs). 
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Of course, the potential for new research resulting from the greater 
public access to these government-collected datasets will depend on the 
level of funding available and the related interest of academics in 
pursuing this research. But the studies noted above and the existence and 
support for the efforts of NCSS, GuideStar, ProPublica, and the 
Nonprofit Open Data Collaborative indicate that both of these critical 
factors exist to some extent. Indeed, two major foundations, the Charles 
Stewart Mott Foundation and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 
helped support the latter effort. 151 
C. Improved Information for the Public 
The government-collected datasets also hold the promise of greater 
information reaching the public in the form of academic research, direct 
public access, and public dissemination through intermediaries. In terms 
of direct access at the federal level, the IRS has recently revamped its 
now-renamed "Tax Exempt Organization Search" function to ease 
public access to its database for tax-exempt nonprofits and to expand the 
amount of information available to the public through it, although it has 
acknowledged some glitches in its implementation. 152 At the state level, 
the Single Portal initiative will include a search feature to allow public 
access to the data collected. 153 
Intermediaries who will likely benefit from the increase public access 
to information include journalists and watchdog organizations. A Wall 
Street Journal reporter recently tapped into the newly available e-filed 
annual information returns data to identify all of the charity employees 
receiving seven-figure annual compensation amounts. 154 Watchdog 
organizations such as Charity Navigator, MinistryWatch, and Wise 
Giving Alliance presumably could also benefit from increased access to 
information about the charities that they evaluate or otherwise provide 
151. See Nonprofit Data Project Updates, ASPEN INST., 
https://www.aspeninstitute.org/programs/program-on-philanthropy-and-social-innovation-
psi/nonprofit-data-project-updates/ [https://perma.cc/UDH9-98QR] (identifying these two 
foundations as the funders for the project). 
152. Press Release, Internal Rev. Serv., New IRS Online Tool Offers Expanded Access to 
Information on Tax-Exempt Organizations; Newly-Filed Data Available to Public for First Time 
(May 7, 2018), https:/ /www.irs.gov/newsroom/new-irs-online-tool-offers-expanded-access-to-
information-on-tax-exempt-organizations-newly-filed-data-available-to-public-for-first-time 
[https://perma.cc/Z7EP-2RA Y]; Von Lienen, supra note 44 ("We had a couple oflittle glitches with 
[the Tax-Exempt Organization Search] that have popped up."). 
153. MRFP, INC., supra note 11. 
154. Andrea Fuller, Million Dollar Paydays Jump for Officials at Charities, WALL STREET J., 
Mar. 6, 2017, at Al. 
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information regarding. 155 For example, while Charity Navigator only 
rates approximately 10,000 charities, it provides basic information for all 
charities registered with the IRS; the amount of such basic information 
available could dramatically increase if Charity Navigator takes 
advantage of access toe-filed annual information returns. 156 
III. THE PERILS OF USING BIG DAT A TO REGULATE 
NONPROFITS 
The promises of applying Big Data methods to nonprofits, both 
through direct effects on government oversight and indirect effects on 
academic research and information available to the public, are therefore 
significant but as yet mostly unrealized. There are, however, a number of 
significant perils associated with such methods that commentators have 
identified generally and all of which apply at least to some extent in the 
context of nonprofits. Some of these concerns arise with respect to 
greater access to data of all types, while some are particular to the Big 
Data context. These perils include faulty results stemming from data 
inaccuracies, analysis inaccuracies, or over-reliance on analysis results. 
They also include larger concerns, such as invasion of privacy, improper 
discrimination, increased government power, and violations of 
constitutional or statutory protections more generally. 157 
A. Getting It Wrong 
One of the greatest concerns raised by commentators regarding Big 
Data is the tendency of some Big Data supporters to oversell what it can 
accomplish. Chris Anderson, then the Editor-in-Chief of Wired 
155. See More About Us, BBB WISE GIVING ALLIANCE, https://www.give.org/about-bbb-
wga/more-about-us/ [https://perma.cc/LT85-5JQY]; About Us, CHARITY NAVIGATOR, 
https://www .charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=content. view&cpid= 1653 [https://perma.cc/739D-
XHLR]; About MinistryWatch, MINISTRYWATCH, https://www.ministrywatch.com/about.php 
[https://perma.cc/7S2J-TWYV]. 
156. See CHARITY NAVIGATOR,About Us, supra note 155. 
157. See generally DAVID BOLLIER, THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF BIG DATA (2010), 
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/pubs/The_Promise_and_Peril_of 
_Big_Data.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3DV-V4VK] (summary of benefits and concerns arising from 
Big Data expressed by participants in an Aspen Institute Roundtable on Information Technology); 
FED. TRADE COMM'N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION?: UNDERSTANDING THE 
ISSUES 8-11 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-
exclusion-understanding-issues/ 160 I 06big-data-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/RK6M-STVR] ( discussing 
concerns relating to private company use of Big Data techniques); Nathan Cortez, Regulation by 
Database, 89 COLO. L. REV. I, 29-37 (2018) (discussing the potential downsides of publicly 
disclosed, government-compiled databases). 
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magazine, once argued that the emergence of Big Data was making the 
scientific method obsolete. 158 But in reality, Big Data methods have 
numerous limitations relating to the data on which they rely, the choices 
regarding how to analyze those data, and the interpretations of the 
results. 159 All of these limitations can be found in the nonprofit area and 
so users of Big Data methods with respect to nonprofits-whether 
government regulators, researchers, or nonprofits and the public more 
generally-have to be conscious of them in order to avoid reaching 
incorrect conclusions or incorrectly applying results. 
1. Data Inaccuracy and Limits: Garbage In, Garbage Out 
At least currently, both the IRS and the major private databases rely 
primarily on information contained in the annual returns filed by tax-
exempt nonprofits. However, the return information is not necessarily 
accurate. Furthermore, the limited reliance on data from other sources 
means that any inaccuracies may remain undetected absent 
individualized consideration of a particular nonprofit, whether through 
an IRS audit or a private party's investigation. And, as already noted, 
datasets may require careful cleaning-for example, matching annual 
information return fields over multiple versions of the form over time-
to be rendered into a format that is amenable to accurate analysis. 160 
Finally, financially smaller tax-exempt nonprofits can file shorter returns 
that contain significantly less information while a large number of tax-
exempt nonprofits-particularly churches and certain church-related 
entities-are not required to file a return. 161 
While research on the accuracy of annual information returns is 
limited, the research that exists indicates that inaccuracies are 
widespread for at least some types of information. In 2000, Professors 
Karen Froelich, Terry Knoepfle, and Thomas Pollalk compared the 
annual information returns for a sample of 350 nonprofit organizations 
158. Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method 
Obsolete, WIRED (June 23, 2008, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory/ 
[https:/ /perma.cc/EZ4 W-J97E]. 
159. Boyd & Crawford, supra note 4, at 666; D. Brent Edwards Jr., Big Data? Big Deal: The 
Inability of Big Data to Escape the Limitations of Impact Evaluations, NORRAG: BLOG (Mar. 12, 
2019), https://www.norrag.org/big-data-big-deal-the-inability-of-big-data-to-escape-the-limitations-
of-impact-evaluation-by-d-brent-edwards-jr/ [https://perma.cc/A4GS-3UJL]. 
160. See Nonprofit Open Data Collective, supra note 54; supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 42, 46 and accompanying text. 
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with their audited financial statements. 162 They found that disparities 
between these two types of documents varied depending on the type of 
information at issue, concluding that "[ v ]ariables outside the primary 
focus of nonprofit organizations, such as net rental income and gross 
profit from sales, and to a lesser extent, management expenses, should 
be used with caution and interpreted carefully." 163 In 2004, Thomas 
Pollak at the Urban Institute reported that he had found a substantial 
portion of tax-exempt nonprofits listed significant contributions 
($50,000 or more) but no fundraising costs on their returns, indicating 
significant underreporting of such costs. 164 A more recent report by the 
Scripps Howard News Service found that 41% of the almost 38,000 tax-
exempt nonprofits that reported at least $1 million in contributions also 
reported no fundraising costs on their returns. 165 It is therefore likely that 
fundraising costs are often underreported, particularly given that some 
watchdog groups have relied heavily on the ratio of programmatic to 
administration and fundraising costs as a measure of nonprofit 
effectiveness and some state regulators have also emphasized this 
ratio.166 
Such inaccurate reporting may extend to other areas that could draw 
negative public or regulator attention. In 2015, Yahoo News reported 
that the National Rifle Association (NRA) had spent millions on 
election-related activities over a number of years but failed to report any 
such expenditures on its IRS annual return as required, an error the NRA 
162. Karen A. Froelich et al., Financial Measures in Nonprofit Organization Research: 
Comparing IRS 990 Return and Audited Financial Statement Data, 29 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY 
SECTOR Q. 232, 232 (2000). 
163. Id. at 251. 
164. MARK A HAGER ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT OVERHEAD Cosrs IN THE 
NONPROFIT SECTOR 1 (2004), https://www.urban.orgisites'defuult/files/publication/57576/310930-What-We-
Know-about-Ovemead-Costs-in-the-Nonprofit-Sector.PDF [https://perrnacc/99HT-5LU5]. 
165. Thomas Hargrove & Waqas Naeem, MONEY FOR NOTHING: WHEN NONPROFITS MISLEAD, 
SCRIPPS How ARD NEWS SERVICE 4 (20 I 2), https://www.scribd.com/document/11194 ! 936/Money-
for-nothing-When-nonprofits-mislead [https://perma.cc/HC7P-VHR Y]. 
166. See, e.g., Criteria & Methodology, CHARITY WATCH, https://www.charitywatch.org/about-
charitywatch/criteria-methodology/3113/314 7 [https://perma.cc/G79V-38J9] (grading charities 
based on the percent of total expenses a charity spent on its programs and the cost to the charity of 
bringing in a $100 of cash donations from the public); N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN., 
PENNIES FOR CHARITY: WHERE YOUR MONEY GoES: F'uNDRAISING BY PROFESSIONAL 
FvNDRAISERS 2 (2018), https://www.charitiesnys.com/pdfs/pennies-for-charity-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7EZ9-N3P4] (focusing on the dollar amount and percentage of total donations to a 
given charity that go toward the expense of professional fundraisers). 
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acknowledged in response. 167 The National Taxpayer Advocate and 
others have also identified numerous errors on the recently created, 
streamlined tax exemption application form (Form 1023-EZ) for smaller, 
charitable nonprofits, which do not bode well for how accurate the 
annual returns filed by these organizations will be. 168 
One of the potential benefits of Big Data is it can identify possible 
inaccuracies by networking and comparing multiple datasets, in effect 
doing on a larger scale and more automatically what the researchers for 
the 2000 study did with a small sample of nonprofits. 169 It is possible 
that the launch of the Single Portal initiative, and with it the ability to 
compare federal information returns with state filings, could take 
advantage of this potential benefit of Big Data. The IRS has also stated it 
will begin using unidentified external data sources to help it identify tax -
exempt nonprofits at risk of certain legal violations involving prohibited 
financial or other benefits for insiders or others, presumably in a manner 
similar to what the IRS already does for taxable individuals and 
entities. 170 It remains to be seen, however, the extent to which this 
networking may identify and help correct inaccuracies in those returns. 
It is of course also possible that networking could inaccurately flag 
entries that are actually correct. For example, Facebook recently began 
labeling a broad range of ads as "political"; if the IRS were to use that 
labeling as an indication of possible prohibited political campaign 
intervention expenditures by charitable nonprofits that purchase 
Facebook ads, it could lead to many false positives. 171 
167. Alan Berlow, The NRA 's brazen shell game with donations: A Yahoo News investigation, 
YAHOO POLITICS (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/the-nras-brazen-shell-game-with-
donations-a-116744915796.html [https://perma.cc/F95W-PH86]. 
168. See Nina E. Olson, A Problem of the IRS's Own Making-Automatic Revocations of 1023-
EZ Exempt Organizations, TAX PAYER ADvoc. SERV.: NTA BLOG (May 16, 2018) 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/nta-blog-automatic-revocation-of-1023EZ-exempt-
organizations [https://perma.cc/GQ6J-F89H] (summarizing concerns relating to the Form 1023-EZ, 
including the relatively high rate of automatic revocation for failure to file required annual returns). 
I 69. See Froelich et al., supra note I 62 and accompanying text. 
170. See Marcus Owens, Materials for "The Current Climate for Nonprofit Enforcement," in EO 
TAX J. 2017-94 (May 12, 2017); supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing how data 
regarding federal grants could be used to check whether tax-exempt nonprofits receiving such grants 
are accurately reporting them); JENNIFER TEEFY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44027, TRACKING 
FEDERAL Aw ARDS: USASPENDING.GOV AND OTHER DATA SOURCES (2019). 
171. Compare Requiring Authorization and Labeling for Ads with Political Content, FACEBOOK 
BUSINESS, https://www.facebook.com/business/news/requiring-authorization-and-labeling-for-ads-
with-political-content [https://perma.cc/S79X-94LG] (identifying as "political" ads relating to "any 
national legislative issue of public importance"), with The Restriction of Political Campaign 
Intervention by Section 501 (c)(3) Tax-Exempt Organizations, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/charities-
non-profits/charitable-organizations/the-restriction-of-political-campaign-intervention-by-section-
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As for cleaning data, the efforts to render the recently released e-filed 
information returns data illustrate the challenges in this area. 172 The 
Aspen Institute's Program on Philanthropy and Social Innovation has 
now hosted two multiple-day events, involving dozens of experts, to 
resolve issues with these data, including reconciling the various versions 
of the returns reflected in the dataset, developing a unified set of 
standards, and checking numerous variables. 173 Yet their work is far 
from complete with respect to the initially available dataset, much less 
subsequent data releases. And, of course, until electronic filing becomes 
mandatory for all tax-exempt nonprofits, this dataset lacks information 
from the significant proportion of such organizations that do not file 
electronically. 
While it may be acceptable to have less information on financially 
smaller organizations since the likely impact of any legal violations by 
such groups is proportionately less as compared to financially larger 
organizations there are a large number of tax-exempt nonprofits that are 
not required to file annual information returns or state registration forms 
and annual reports. Most notably, this exempt group includes all 
churches and certain church-related entities, regardless of their financial 
size or scope of activities, unless they have unrelated trade or 
businesses. 174 By most estimates there are between 300,000 and 450,000 
churches of all faiths in the United States, ranging from tiny 
neighborhood congregations to enormous megachurches and 
denominational bodies. 175 While figures are difficult to determine in this 
area because of the lack of government filings, one recent study 
estimated these entities had at least $100 billion in annual gross revenue 
and $600 billion in real property assets. 176 By comparison, for tax year 
2015, tax-exempt charities that file Form 990 annual information returns 
50 I c3-tax-exempt-organizations [https://perma.cc// APL2-657T] (identifying as "political" only 
communications or actions relating to candidates for elective public office). 
172. See Nonprofit Open Data Collective, supra note 54; supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
173. Cinthia S. Ottinger, Aspen Hosts 990 "Vali-Datathon" as Part of Philanthropy's Data Revolution, 
AsPEN INSTITUTE: BLOO (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/aspen-hosts-990-vali-
datathon-part-philanthropys-data-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/59TH-8RGF]. 
174. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2017 INSTRUCTIONS 
FOR FORM 990T EXEMPT ORGANIZATION BUSINESS INCOME TAX RETURN (AND PROXY TAX 
UNDER SECTION 6033(E)) 2 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i990t-20l 7.pdf 
[https://perma.ccNL66-65W9] ("Who Must File" section). 
175. See Simon G. Brauer, How Many Congregations Are There? Updating a Survey-Based 
Estimate, 56 J. SCI. STUDY RELIGION 438,439,445 (2017). 
176. Ryan T. Cragun et al., Research Report: How Secular Humanists (and Everyone Else) 
Subsidize Religion in the United States, FREE INQUIRY, June-July 2012, at 39, 41-42. 
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reported $2.0 trillion in annual revenue and $3.8 trillion in assets, the 
latter partly offset by $ 1.5 trillion in liabilities. 177 Any use by 
government regulators or private parties of Big Data methods will miss 
this significant part of the nonprofit universe. 
Lastly, there is a lot of important information relating to nonprofits 
that the IRS understandably does not ask for because it is not directly 
relevant to compliance with the applicable tax laws. Perhaps the most 
obvious area is information on how effective or impactful a nonprofit is 
in achieving its stated mission or goals. Even for the largest nonprofits 
with the broadest range of activities, all that the form requires are brief 
statements relating to program service accomplishments in the 
nonprofit's largest program areas. 178 While the Form 990 instructions 
purport to require specific information, such as clients served, in practice 
many if not most organizations provide vague, self-serving 
statements. 179 
2. Analysis Inaccuracy and Limits: The Ghost in the Machine 
The sophisticated computational tools that can be applied to Big Data 
datasets, particularly ones that self correct as a result of machine 
learning, hold out the promise of finding the proverbial needle in the 
haystack in the form of previously undiscovered patterns and 
relationships. At the same time, "the information revealed by big data 
analysis isn't necessarily perfect. Identifying a pattern doesn't establish 
whether that pattern is significant. Correlation still doesn't equal 
causation .... In big data, as with all data, interpretation is always 
important."180 
It is difficult to judge the methods used by TE/GE as part of its new 
data-driven approach to select annual information returns for audit since 
TE/GE understandably does not share the details of its algorithms in 
order to avoid providing a roadmap for intentional wrongdoers to avoid 
177. STATISTICS OF INCOME DIVISION, IRS, TBL. I, FORM 990 RETURNS OF 50l(c)(3) 
ORGANIZATIONS: BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT ITEMS, BY ASSET SIZE, TAX YEAR 
2015 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15eo01.xlsx (last visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
178. See IRS 2018 INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990, supra note 46, at 11-12. 
179. See, e.g., President and Fellows of Harvard College, Form 990, at 2 (2017) (listing two 
specific program service accomplishments described in two, relatively short paragraphs: one 
"education and other institutional activities" involving "approximately 7,330 undergraduate and 
14,460 graduate students," and the other "sponsored activities, including sponsored research" for 
which the University "incurred $806,228,926 in expenses funded by sponsored awards"). 
180. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 20, at 7. 
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IRS scrutiny. 181 While the initial report of a high change rate for audits 
that results from this process is encouraging, without knowing how 
significant the changes were that were discovered or a rigorous 
comparison with the change rate resulting from other selection methods, 
it is impossible to evaluate how effective the new process has been as 
compared to other methods. 182 That said, the IRS is evaluating its 
methods; the acting TE/GE Commissioner recently stated that when it 
evaluated data-driven attempts to identify noncompliance among private 
foundations, no action resulted in 48% of identified cases, indicating this 
might not be a fruitful approach. 183 To address this gap further, studies 
by both the IRS and other internal government offices that are allowed 
access to the details of such methods are needed, along the lines of the 
2015 Government Accountability Office study that highlighted the need 
to strength internal controls for selection processes then employed by 
TE/GE for tax-exempt nonprofits. 184 
External researchers could aid in this process by publicly developing 
and testing their own algorithms and other methods for analyzing the 
data released by the IRS and the states, and also the data available from 
other sources regarding nonprofits. In doing so, they need to be 
especially conscious of the fact that in general these methods reveal 
correlations but do not demonstrate causation; any correlations revealed 
represent, at best, highly probable relationships but not absolute 
certainty. In other words, outside researchers and the IRS need to 
recognize that Big Data methods may identify when there is a greater 
likelihood of illegal behavior, but they rarely if ever generate 100% 
accurate results. 185 This is particularly true when Big Data methods are 
used to predict future behavior of individuals or organizations, the risks 
of which were made famous by the short story and movie The Minority 
Report.186 However, in the nonprofit context, no one is advocating 
181. See Zarsky, supra note 143, at 1512. 
182. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
183. Von Lienen, supra note 44 (reporting the 48% no change rate as an improvement over the 
previous 65% no change rate). 
184. U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-514, IRS EXAMINATION SELECTION: 
INTERNAL CONTROLS FOR EXEMPT ORGANIZATION SELECTION SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 52-53 
(2015); see also TIGTA, supra note 36 (evaluating RAAS project management practices). 
185. See MA YER-SCHONBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 132, at 50-72 ( correlation and Big Data). 
186. See Philip K.. Dick, The Minority Report, in SELECTED STORIES OF PHILIP K.. DICK 227 
(2002); THE MINORITY REPORT (20th Century Fox 2002). This field is formally known as 
"predictive analytics." See Zarsky, supra note 143, at 1505--06. 
2019] USING BIG DATA TO REGULATE NONPROFITS 1317 
letting the computers find a violation of even civil law, much less 
criminal law, without a human-conducted, case-by-case analysis. 187 
For example, say that an analysis reveals a significant correlation 
between a nonprofit reporting that it lacks a conflict of interest policy 
and a nonprofit later reporting an excess benefit transaction. 188 This 
result would indicate that nonprofits reporting no conflict of interest 
policy are at greater risk of excess benefit transactions. This result would 
not indicate, however, that requiring nonprofits to adopt a conflict of 
interest policy would reduce this risk, because it is unknown whether the 
absence of this policy leads to the excess benefit transaction or whether 
there might be a third, unmeasured factor that may cause both the lack of 
such a policy and an excess benefit transaction. The lack of a conflict of 
interest policy itself would not be a full proof predictor of a future 
excess benefit transaction, only an indication of a higher risk for such a 
transaction. Of course, being selected for an audit is not the equivalent of 
being found guilty of a civil or criminal violation-that would still 
require a human-conducted, individualized analysis-but such selection 
is also not costless to the affected nonprofit or the government, so any 
supposed correlations should be subject to rigorous testing before being 
relied upon for audit selection purposes. 
3. Over-Reliance: But the Computer Told Me to Do It 
Big Data methods can lead to excessive claims of accuracy and 
objectivity that in tum lead to over-reliance on results. 189 Simply because 
certain results are drawn from Big Data datasets using computerized 
analytics does not mean they provide an accurate or complete picture of 
the legal compliance of nonprofits such that other methods for 
measuring compliance are now obsolete and unreliable in comparison. 
As noted by David Solove, one problem with reliance on databases "is 
that such records often fail to tell the entire story."190 Inaccuracy may 
187. But such reliance on computers is starting to occur in other legal contexts; for example, 
Estonia is in the process of designing a "robot judge" to resolve small claims disputes. See Eric 
Niiler, Can Al Be a Fair Judge in Court? Estonia Thinks So, WIRED (Mar. 25, 2019, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/can-ai-be-fair-judge-court-estonia-thinks-so/ [https://perma.cc/S44Y-
WHFG]. 
188. See 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2012) (defining "excess benefit" as the provision of a legally 
prohibited, undue economic benefit to an insider). Taxes are imposed on persons who benefit from 
an excess benefit transaction and managers who approve such a transaction. Id. 
189. Boyd & Crawford, supra note 4, at 666---oS. 
190. David J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information 
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1424 (2001). 
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arise from problems with the underlying data or the methods used to 
analyze it, as already noted. 191 But even when those problems are 
adequately addressed, the limits on Big Data necessarily mean that it 
cannot fully replace other methods of discovering legal noncompliance, 
such as individual complaints, new stories, and whistleblowers. A focus 
on Big Data also could lead to the IRS and state agencies devoting even 
fewer resources to providing needed guidance regarding the legal rules 
applicable to nonprofits, which-particularly at the federal level-has 
already declined significantly in recent years. 192 
B. Larger Concerns 
Beyond inaccuracy and over-reliance concerns, other Big Data issues 
raised loom quite large. These include risks to privacy, prohibited 
discriminatory treatment, enhanced government power, and other 
conflicts with constitutional and statutory limits on government power. 
1. Invasion of Privacy: Welcome to the Goldfish Bowl 
Arguably, the greatest risk of Big Data analytics-loss of privacy-is 
inapplicable to nonprofits because they are already required to publicly 
disclose private information. 193 However, there are at least two privacy-
related issues. The first is the inadvertent disclosure of personal or other 
sensitive information. The second is the unintended consequences of 
greater access to information that comes with Big Data, including its 
possible use with other data to provide a more complete profile of 
individuals and other entities associated with nonprofits. 194 
Privacy "encompasses not only avoiding observation, or keeping 
one's personal matters and relationships secret, but also the ability to 
share information selectively but not publicly."195 The risk of Big Data is 
both that nonprofits lose the ability to control data about themselves and 
that no one is ultimately controlling the use of those data since it is 
191. See supra Part III. 
192. See Mayer, supra note 66, at 93-94. 
193. See Alfred Ng, Tech 's invasion of our privacy made us more paranoid in 2018, CNET (Dec. 
7, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/techs-invasion-of-our-privacy-made-us-more-
paranoid-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/Q6KC-5EB3]; supra notes 88, 116 and accompanying text 
(public disclosure of nonprofit government filings). 
194. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PREsIDENf, BIG DATA AND PRIYACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
(2014 ), httpsJ / obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and 
_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf[httpsJ/perma.cc/58EX-85Q6] (identifying such use as "data fusion" that "occurs 
when data from different sources are brought into contact and new facts emerge"). 
195. /d.at2. 
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readily accessible to anyone for almost any purpose. 196 Much of the 
recent outrage against Facebook did not involve its use of data regarding 
its users--which was presumably expected by them--but the use of its 
data by others, such as Cambridge Analytica, in ways that were 
unexpected. 197 
As for inadvertent disclosure of personal information, this can happen 
either because a nonprofit provides such information on its government 
filings even though not required to do so or because a nonprofit provides 
required personal information that is not subject to public disclosure but 
somehow that information is in fact publicly disclosed. The first 
situation has included listing the home addresses of directors, officers, 
employees, grantees, or others affiliated in some way with the nonprofit, 
even though the organization's address may now be provided instead, 
and even listing the Social Security numbers of such individuals. 198 This 
of course is an unforced error by the nonprofits involved and therefore 
could be at least partially addressed by better IRS instructions and public 
education. 199 
The more troubling situation is when a nonprofit is required to 
provide certain personal information to the IRS and that information is 
publicly disclosed even though it is not supposed to be. This situation 
has arisen for donor information that is not subject to public disclosure 
for most tax-exempt nonprofits, with public release arising from both 
IRS and nonprofit errors. 200 Some state authorities have also begun 
196. See Solove, supra note 190, at 1428 ('"[C]ontrol out of control'-a situation where nobody 
is exercising meaningful control over the information."). 
197. Ian Sherr, Facebook, Cambridge Analytica and data mining: What you need to know, CNET 
(Apr. 18, 2018, 5: IO PM), https:/ /www.cnet.com/news/facebook-cambridge-analytica-data-mining-
and-trump-what-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/NX6Q-A58Y]. 
198. See Noelle Barton, Many Nonprofits Include Social Security Numbers on Public Documents, 
Study Finds, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Apr. 11, 2012), https://www.philanthropy.com/article/Many-
Nonprofit-Documents/156741 [https://perma.cc/R9BU-XWBU]. A study of Form 990 filings from 
2001 to 2006 found that more than 132,000 nonprofits had included at least one social security 
number on that form. Id.; Christopher Quay, Changes, New Schedule to Draft Redesign Form 990 
Coming, Official Says, TAXNOTESTODAY I (Nov. 19,2007). 
199. See, e.g., IRS, supra note 46, at 2 ("Reminder: Don't Include Social Security Numbers on 
Publicly Disclosed Forms") (emphasis omitted). 
200. See, e.g., Mark J. Fitzgibbons, Oklahoma Secretary of State "Doxxes" O'Keefe Donors, THE 
DAILY CALLER (Dec. 19, 2017, 2:48 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2017/12/19/oklahoma-secretary-
of-state-doxxes-okeefe-donors/ [https://perma.cc/J9FC-DF2Q] (reporting that a nonprofit failed to 
redact donor information when it filed a copy of its IRS return with a state agency that released all 
nonprofit filings to the public); Tom Metcalf, A Peek Into Goldman's Black Box Charity Reveals 
Tech Billionaires, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2018, 1:00 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-14/peek-into-goldman-s-black-box-charity-
reveals-tech-billionaires [https://perma.cc/DA28-LWRC] (reporting that the IRS failed to redact 
donor information from a filing provided to GuideStar); Sam Stein, Mitt Romney's PAC Funded 
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asking for urned.acted copies of the federal schedule that lists donor 
information; while those authorities usually commit to keep the 
schedules private, such requests add another possible source of 
inadvertent disclosures.201 The few press reports describing such 
situations indicate that they are rare although they have attracted 
congressional attention. 202 In fact, the IRS is planning to eliminate the 
requirement that non-charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits provide donor 
information to the IRS in part because of these concems.203 
The increasing ease of access to return and other information relating 
to nonprofits raises a subtler, but potentially greater, privacy concern. 
One aspect of Big Data is the growing ability to connect multiple 
datasets in order to discover patterns or other information that is not 
apparent by analyzing only one of the datasets in isolation. Say a 
nonprofit reports-as it is required to do--its compensation for various 
officers and other highly paid employees. Most people, at least in the 
United States, view compensation information as private and only to be 
shared selectively with others. Senior employees and officers of tax-
exempt nonprofits hopefully know that as a consequence of their 
employer's favorable tax status their compensation will be publicly 
revealed. But what they might not expect is that a private company could 
obtain this publicly available data and connect those data with its 
existing database of potential customer profiles, for which compensation 
Anti-Gay Marriage Group Under The Radar, HUFFPOST: POL. BLOG (Mar. 30, 2012, I :59 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/30/mitt-romney-gay-marriage_n_l391867.html 
[https://perma.cc/QL85-78SP] (reporting that donor information became public because of a leaked 
IRS filing). 
201. See, e.g., Am. for Prosperity Found. v. Harris, 809 F.3d 536,538 (9th Cir. 2015) (discussing 
the California requirement that charities submit to the Attorney General a copy of the (nonpublic) 
donor information submitted to the IRS). The Single Portal could help states ensure such 
information remains private by establishing a uniform process for handling the donor schedules. 
202. See, e.g., Letter from Representative Trey Gowdy et al., to David J. Kautter, Assistant Sec'y 
for Tax Policy (June 27, 2018), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018-06-
27-TG-JJ-MM-to-Kautter-IRS-Schedule-B-Briefing.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/5H6A-H2RQ] ( discussing 
how members of Congress objected to the requirement that tax-exempt nonprofits report the names 
and addresses of all substantial contributors to the IRS); see also Cavanaugh et al., supra note 49, at 
50-51 (outlining a TE/GE Advisory Committee recommendation to consider eliminating the 
required reporting of donor information as part of expanding e-filing). 
203. See Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt 
Organizations, 84 Fed. Reg. 47,447, 47,451-52 (proposed Sept. IO, 2019) (to be codified at 26 
C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposing regulations that in relevant part would eliminate the requirement that tax-
exempt nonprofits report the names and addresses of their contributors on their annual information 
returns, other than for section 501(c)(3) organizations). The IRS could not eliminate the requirement 
for charitable, tax-exempt nonprofits because that requirement is statutory. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6033(b)(5) (2012) (stating how section 501(c)(3) organizations must include in their annual 
information return "the names and addresses of all substantial contributors"). 
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level may be an important element. Such linkages may actually be 
harmful to the individuals involved if, for example, their compensation 
information is used to adjust upward the prices charged to them based on 
their income. However, using data in this way does not appear to be 
widespread at this point, and, fortunately, there is little evidence of more 
nefarious use of such data.204 Nevertheless, the greater availability of 
what many would consider sensitive, personal information may raise 
concerns with those who consider working for a nonprofit. 205 
2. Prohibited Discrimination: Can Computers Be Racist? 
Another prominent Big Data concern is that it could lead to 
discrimination based on race, gender, or other prohibited grounds, 
including inadvertently through the reproduction of existing patterns of 
discrimination.206 Countering such discrimination can be tricky, in part, 
because adjusting the results of Big Data analysis to compensate for 
such impacts may be technically difficult or may itself raise 
discrimination concerns.207 Obvious areas in which discrimination 
concerns can arise are the criminal justice and employment contexts. For 
example, a recent study found that ads for STEM jobs were less likely to 
be shown to women than to men on Facebook as ads targeting women 
on Facebook are more expensive. 208 But discrimination concerns can 
204. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND DIFFERENTIAL PRICING 8-13 (2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/docs/Big_Data_Report_N 
onembargo_ v2. pdf [https://perma.cc/9M9K-5TU7]. 
205. For similar concerns relating to the use of personal data to target political advertisements, 
see Bethany Shiner, Big Data, Small Law: How Gaps in Regulation are Affecting Political 
Campaigning Methods and the Need for Fundamental Reform, Abstract (Oct. 28, 2018), 
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract_id=3274212 [https://perma.cc/UCV7-F6MV] 
("[T]he law cannot adequately deal with the issues posed by the collection and use of personal data 
for the design and deployment of targeted social media political campaign advertisements."). 
206. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: A REPORT ON ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS, 
OPPORTUNITY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 5-6 (May 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/20 l 6_0504_data_discrimin 
ation.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC2E-NDXS]; FTC, supra note 157; Solon Barocas & Andrew D. 
Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673-74 (2016); Cynthia Dwork & 
Deirdre K. Mulligan, It's Not Privacy, and It's Not Fair, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 35-36 
(2013). 
207. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 206, at 714-I 5. 
208. Anja Lambrecht & Catherine E. Tucker, Algorithmic Bia5? An Empirical Study into Apparent 
Gender-Based Discrimination in the Display of STEM Career Ads, MARKETING SCI. FRONTIERS 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 1), available at httpsJ/papers.ssm.corn/so13/papers.cfin?abstract_id=2852260 
(httpsJ/permacc/4PXD-CED5]. 
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also arise in many other situations, such as access to credit and higher 
education. 209 
Consider the recent Tea Party application controversy at the IRS. 
While political smoke has made discerning the underlying facts difficult, 
the most innocuous description of what occurred is that IRS employees, 
in a good faith effort to do their jobs efficiently and effectively, chose 
certain terms for their Be On the Lookout (BOLO) list that, 
unintentionally, disparately impacted politically conservative applicants 
by subjecting them to greater scrutiny than some other applicants.210 The 
same risk exists for the use of Big Data to select which tax -exempt 
nonprofits to audit in that some algorithms might have a disparate 
impact on certain types of nonprofits. For example, what if a correlation 
is found between the risk of legal noncompliance and location in certain 
zip codes, which happen to correspond to low-income areas? Using that 
correlation to select nonprofits for audit could, unintentionally, 
disparately impact nonprofits led by members of minority racial or 
ethnic groups, if groups with such leaders are disproportionately based 
in low income areas. Another example might be if compensation 
information for nonprofit executives was used to get around laws 
prohibiting inquiring about compensation history. 211 These laws are 
usually justified as seeking to reduce gender disparities m 
compensation. 212 
Computer scientists are well aware of these possible issues and have 
engaged in extensive research on possible technical fixes to address 
them. 213 A number of algorithm developers have made their initial 
algorithms open source so that anyone can analyze them and detect 
potential discrimination issues, among other problems. 214 While this may 
be less possible in the nonprofit context given the enforcement-focused 
209. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA AND DIFFERENTIAL PRICING, supra note 
206, at 4. 
210. See Leandra Ledennan, IRS Reform: Politics As Usual?, 7 COLUM. J. TAXL. 36, 50-52 (2016). 
211. See Aine Cain et al., 9 places in the US where job candidates may never have to answer the 




213. See FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY IN MACHINE LEARNING (FAT/ML), 
SCHOLARSHIP, http://www.fatml.org/resources/relevant-scholarship [https://perma.cc/U3Y6-X4A7]. 
214. See, e.g., Justin Sherman, How Open Source Can Fight Algorithmic Bias, THE STARTUP 
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://medium.com/swlh/how-open-source-can-fight-algorithmic-bias-
836a!Oe409f9 [https://perma.cc/8ABV-8SW4] (describing the use of open source technology and 
methodologies to combat data bias). 
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IRS and state regulator role, the key initial requirement for addressing 
such concerns is awareness that these issues can arise and a willingness 
to consider how otherwise acceptable data collection and analysis 
methods may, unintentionally, result in objectionable disparate impacts. 
Once identified, the necessary resources must be committed to 
eliminating such impacts to the degree possible. 
3. Increased Government Power: Orwell and Kafka, 
With new technology comes the risk that governments may deploy 
that technology to increase their power vis-a-vis the governed, especially 
if existing limits on governmental power fit poorly with such 
advances.215 Big Data, with its mass collection and analysis of 
information relating to the governed and their organizations, certainly 
raises such concerns.216 This concern is particularly pronounced when 
government makes what Professors Ian Kerr and Jessica Earle label 
"preemptive predictions;" a well-known example would be placing an 
individual on the no-fly list because Big Data finds a correlation 
between her attributes and the likelihood of engaging in terrorist activity 
on an airplane.217 
This concern is less pronounced in the nonprofit context, however, for 
at least two reasons. First, both the IRS and state authorities have 
authority to open an audit or investigation of any nonprofit in their 
jurisdiction for any rational reason other than reasons that are 
constitutionally or otherwise legally prohibited. The one exception for 
the IRS is churches, for which Congress requires specific findings to 
commence an inquiry or audit.218 But since the IRS lacks annual return 
data for churches the application by the IRS of a Big Data approach to 
them is not feasible at this point under any conditions.219 Second, the 
data collected and analyzed for nonprofits are usually viewed as 
reasonably related to their compliance with applicable laws, although 
there are occasional debates on this point with respect to certain specific 
information collected. 220 
215. See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HAR.v. L. REV. 2296, 
2297-99 (2014). 
216. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 20, at 22. 
217. Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data Threatens 
Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 67 (2013). 
218. See 26 U.S.C. § 7611 (2012). 
219. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
220. See, e.g., Lloyd H. Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First 
Century: An Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REY. 479, 479-80 & nn.1-3 (2010) 
1324 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1281 
There is, however, one issue in this regard. By asking certain 
questions on the required annual information return, the IRS may 
influence nonprofit behavior in a way that goes beyond what the law 
requires. For example, a little over ten years ago the IRS added return 
questions asking whether the nonprofit completing the return had certain 
governance practices, even though federal law does not require those 
specific practices.221 Many commentators, including the TE/GE's own 
Advisory Committee, worried that the IRS asking these questions would 
put pressure on all nonprofits to adopt these practices even it might be 
unwise for them to do so.222 The increasing ability of both the IRS and 
outside parties to search return information and identify correlations 
between the answers to these governance-related questions and 
compliance with federal tax law increases the risk that tax-exempt 
nonprofits may feel pressured to adopt such practices not because of 
their inherent value but because the lack of them might be perceived as 
increasing the risk of IRS audit or adverse public attention. Similarly, 
Congress has chosen to focus greater attention on charitable, tax-exempt 
hospitals by requiring them to provide information regarding their 
provision of certain community benefits and adoption of policies relating 
to such benefits, even though current law only requires such hospitals to 
provide community benefits generally, without mandating any 
specifics. 223 This underlines the dynamic nature of correlations; just 
asking certain questions might cause a change in behavior, which might 
in turn be correlated with greater, or less, legal compliance. 
If asking certain questions on the Form 990 does in fact lead to a 
change in behavior, that fact could tempt the IRS or Congress to add 
further questions relating to practices they deem desirable in order to 
push nonprofits toward adopting them, even though such practices are 
not legally required. States could engage in similar encouragement 
through questions on their required registration and reporting forms. The 
only apparent way to stop this increase in government power would be 
for the government actors to restrain themselves from exercising their 
form-drafting discretion in this manner or, to the extent this restraint is 
( discussing a disagreement over federal role in nonprofit governance, including collecting information 
regarding governance practices); Fred Stokeld, IRS Drops Donor Disclosure Requirements, 82 EXEMPT 
ORG. TAX REV. 113 (2018) ( disagreement over need to collect donor information). 
221. See Bonnie S. Brier et al., The Appropriate Role of the Internal Revenue Service With 
Respect To Tax-Exempt Organization Good Governance Issues, in ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TAX 
EXEMPT AND GoVERNMENT ENTITIES (ACT) REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 3, 46 (2008), 
https:/ /www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p4344--2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/6US2-4 WZ7]. 
222. See id.; Mayer & Wilson, supra note 220, at 480 n.3 (other critics). 
223. See 26 U.S.C. § 50l(r) (2012); Rev. Ru!. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. 
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lacking at the agency level, for the relevant legislature to forbid them 
from doing so. 
4. Other Legal Limits: Building a Plane While You Are Flying 
Commonly cited constitutional limitations on government deployment 
of Big Data are the free speech clause of the First Amendment, the 
Fourth Amendment's limits on searches and seizures, and the due 
process obligations under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 224 The 
protections provided by these provisions are related in part, but not 
entirely, to the privacy concerns discussed above. 225 There are few, if 
any, statutory or other legal limitations specifically targeting government 
use of Big Data methods.226 In the federal tax context, the IRS is limited 
by generally applicable taxpayer privacy requirements, except for 
information Congress has explicitly made subject to public disclosure. 227 
It is also limited by third party contact rules.228 
Government use of Big Data implicates the First Amendment if such 
use places burdens on free speech, including but not limited to impairing 
the ability of individuals to speak anonymously, to associate with others 
without public disclosure, or to make intimate decisions without 
government interference, all of which are aspects of privacy. 229 It also 
implicates the Fourth Amendment to the extent the collection and use of 
personal data without the knowledge and consent of the affected 
224. See MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRNACY PROTECTIONS 7-11 (2007); Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance 
State, 93 MINN. L. REV. I, 19-23 (2008); Ian Kerr, Predication, Preemption, Presumption: The 
Path of Law After the Computational Tum, in PRIYACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL 
TuRN: THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 91, 108 (Mireille 
Hildebrandt & Katja de Vries eds., 2013). 
225. See KUHN, supra note 224, at 11-12 (different conceptualizations of privacy). 
226. The most prominent federal guidance appears to be the Federal Trade Commission's non-
binding "Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace" set of guidelines relating to 
consumer-oriented commercial Internet sites. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRNACY ONLINE: FAIR 




227. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012). 
228. See 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (2012). 
229. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 341-42 (1995); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958); KUHN, 
supra note 224, at 51-76. 
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individuals is a search or seizure in the Fourth Amendment sense.230 
Finally such use implicates the due process requirements of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the extent that Big Data methods infringe on 
the life, liberty (including with respect to privacy), or property of 
individuals and their associations.231 
In the nonprofit context, these constitutional concerns are muted but 
not completely absent. As already noted, privacy is not as obviously a 
pressing concern for nonprofits as it is in most other areas because 
almost all of the data at issue are already required by law to be publicly 
disclosed.232 But the possible use of Big Data methods to reveal 
connections involving individuals still has privacy implications, and also 
Big Data methods could lead to disparate impacts based on the views 
expressed by nonprofits and therefore raise First Amendment concerns, 
especially since it could be difficult to determine if such disparate 
impacts were intentional or inadvertent. 
For the data drawn from the annual information returns there are 
usually no Fourth Amendment concerns because the nonprofits 
themselves provide such data, as one of the conditions on the tax 
benefits they receive. In the future, however, Fourth Amendment 
concerns could arise for the IRS and state officials obtaining data from 
other sources without the knowledge or consent of the nonprofits 
involved, such as through mining social media or reading email, text, or 
other communication traffic. For example, the Supreme Court recently 
held that an individual has "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
record of his physical movements as captured through [cell-site location 
data]" and therefore this information is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.233 Finally, and as Professor Danielle Keats Citron has 
highlighted, any automated decisionmaking process-such as one used 
to select nonprofits to audit or otherwise investigate-raises significant 
due process concerns with respect to notice and the opportunity to 
heard.234 Due process concerns are heightened if an automated decision-
230. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S._, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217-18 (2018) (applying 
the Fourth Amendment to collection of cell phone location records); United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (applying the Fourth Amendment to attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle 
and use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements). 
231. See KUHN, supra note 224, at 200--01 (discussing due process and privacy as knowledge control). 
232. See supra notes 88, 116 and accompanying text (discussing public disclosure of nonprofit 
government filings). Improper disclosure of the limited information that is not supposed to be 
subject to public disclosure appears to be relatively rare. See supra note 200 ( outlining instances of 
improper disclosure). 
233. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217. 
234. Danielle K. Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 1249, 1281-88 (2008). 
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making process results in reflexive imposition of some type of penalty, 
such as revocation of tax-exempt status or a cease-and-desist order 
relating to charitable solicitation. At this point, however, no government 
regulator of nonprofits appears be going beyond audit selection based 
solely on algorithmic results. 
While statutory or other legal limitations targeted specifically at Big 
Data methods do not exist at either the federal or state level, the IRS is 
subject to general taxpayer privacy and third party contact rules that may 
be implicated by the collection and analysis of data. 235 To maintain 
taxpayer privacy, the IRS is prohibited from publicly disclosing which 
specific tax-exempt nonprofits it is auditing or even the results of such 
audits unless the audit leads to revocation of tax exemption.236 This 
limitation hinders the ability of outside parties to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the IRS' s selection processes for audits, including any 
Big Data methods used. As for third party contacts where the IRS is 
inquiring about a specific individual or other entity to learn information 
relevant to tax liability, the IRS as a matter of practice seeks to obtain 
the desired information from the audit target, such as a tax -exempt 
nonprofit, before contacting a third party.237 It is not clear, however, that 
this limitation would apply to a general request for information relating 
to multiple tax-exempt nonprofits, such as a broad request for social 
media data. This is because the IRS Internal Revenue Manual provides 
that the definition of third-party contacts does not include "[s]earches 
made on computer databases that do not require any personal 
involvement on the other end."238 This exception might apply to at least 
some broad inquiries because the IRS may be able to draw information 
from some commercial databases to which it gains access through 
inquiries that are mediated solely by the computers that store the 
databases and so do not involve any human beings outside of the agency. 
The uncertainty regarding whether and how the constitutional 
limitations and the applicable statutory limitations apply to Big Data 
collection and analysis mean that nonprofits subject to Big Data methods 
may face a costly and risky battle if they choose to challenge the actions 
of the IRS based on any of these other legal limits. It took congressional 
attention to end the IRS tactic of reading emails of taxpayers without 
235. See supra notes 225-228 and accompanying text. 
236. See 26 U.S.C. §§6103(a), (bX2)(A) (2012); Revocations of 50l(c)(3) Detenninations, INTERNAL 
REvENuE SERv., httpsJ/www.irs.gov/charities-non-profits/charitable-organizations/revocations-of-501 c3-
deterrninations [httpsJ/perma.cc/7B:X:X-RYFF]. 
237. I.R.S. Notification Requirements, IRM 25.27.1.3(1) (Oct. 19, 2017). 
238. ld. at 25.27.1.2(2)(a). 
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consent, notice, or court permission. 239 It may therefore take concerted 
action by umbrella organizations, including through calling for 
congressional action when warranted, to fully apply these limits to the 
use of Big Data methods with respect to nonprofits. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Considering the steps that government agencies and private parties 
have taken to apply Big Data methods to overseeing and studying 
nonprofits, along with the promises and perils that doing so present, 
there are several recommendations that regulators, researchers, and 
nonprofits should consider. For agencies and legislatures, continued 
pursuit of these methods is clearly desirable, but specific steps must be 
taken to rigorously evaluate their effectiveness and to avoid the potential 
perils they present. For researchers, the easier access to much greater 
amounts of data relating to nonprofits must be tempered by recognition 
of those data's limitations and the possible effects such research could 
have on nonprofits. And for nonprofits, they must complete their 
government filings with the knowledge that ever-greater numbers of 
people will be accessing them and also the awareness that other, publicly 
accessible information such as their websites and social media presences 
may be compared with those filings for consistency and completeness. 
A. For Regulators 
Given the acknowledged resource limitations faced by the IRS and 
state agencies when it comes to overseeing nonprofits, it is imperative 
that they continue to leverage the technological advantages that a Big 
Data approach to such oversight provides if they can do so cost 
effectively.240 At the same time, and as the IRS has acknowledged, not 
every algorithm will prove effective and efficient in identifying 
239. See Houser & Sanders, supra note 28, at 823, 823 n.31 (citing Tim Sampson, IRS Reverses 
Course on Warrantless Email Snooping, DAILY DOT, (Apr. 17, 2013), 
https://www.dailydot.com/news/irs-email-warrantless-snooping-reversal/ [https://perma.cc/2UTK-
UQNE]). 
240. See supra section II.A (resource limitations). This recommendation assumes that a Big Data 
approach would allow regulators to do more with their existing, limited resources even given the 
technological challenges of implementing this approach, which assumption is generally consistent 
with the views of commentators. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 20, at 37-
38 ("Big data holds enormous power to make the provision of services more efficient across the 
entire spectrum of government activity .... "); MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 5, at 25 (predicting 
"that we will, at some point, see investments in big-data-related capital deepening pay off in the 
form of productivity gains"). 
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nonprofits that are likely out of compliance with the applicable law.241 
This is particularly true given the possible accuracy issues with both the 
underlying data and the tools used to analysis them. 242 It is therefore 
important that the agencies themselves rigorously evaluate whether the 
specific methods chosen are significantly more effective at detecting 
noncompliance as compared to other, non-Big Data approaches, and that 
independent oversight entities such as the Treasury Inspector General for 
Tax Administration also do so.243 The IRS has stated that it continues to 
rely heavily on its "robust referral process" to identify noncompliance, 
along with more data-driven methods.244 There may also be a role for 
outside researchers in this regard, as detailed in the next section, 
although that role is necessarily limited by the need for such agencies to 
limit public access to the criteria used to identify nonprofits that are 
likely to be violating the applicable laws.245 
Regulators may also have to consider making more efforts to ensure 
that government filings are accurate. In theory, inaccuracies can result in 
an IRS return being treated as incomplete, triggering late filing 
penalties.246 Inaccuracies can also theoretically result in a perjury 
conviction for the nonprofit leader who signs the retum. 247 However, it 
is, at best, unclear how often the IRS imposes penalties for inaccurate 
information.248 While in early 2018 the IRS implemented a new process 
for rejecting incomplete or incorrect paper-filed Form 990s, leading to 
an over 10% rejection rate, it is unclear what other steps the IRS has 
241. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the ineffectiveness of approach used 
to try to identify noncompliant private foundations). 
242. See supra sections lll.A. l, III.A.2. 
243. See About TIGTA, TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/about.shtml [https://perma.cc/JF5W-8A7Z] (noting their mission to 
"[p ]rovide quality, professional audit, investigative, and inspection and evaluation services that 
promote integrity, economy, and efficiency in the administration of the Nation's tax system"). 
244. Von Lienen, supra note 44. 
245. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
246. See 26 U.S.C. § 6652(c)(l)(ii) (2012) (stating that an excise tax can be imposed on a tax-
exempt nonprofit for "a failure to include any of the information required to be shown on [an annual 
information return] ... or to show the correct information"). 
247. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (creating a felony for willfully making and subscribing any return that 
contains a written declaration that it is made under the penalties of perjury if the person doing so 
does not believe the return to be true and correct as to every material matter); IRS, 2018 FORM 990 
supra note 50, at 1 (stating that a signature is made "[u]nder penalties of perjury"). 
248. See IRS, supra note 47, at 42-43 & n.14 (reporting the assessment of approximately 54,000 
"daily delinquency'' penalties, totaling approximately $177 million, but indicating such penalties are 
primarily for failures to file). 
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taken to improve return accuracy. 249 To the extent the IRS's Big Data 
approaches rely primarily if not almost exclusively on annual 
information return data, the IRS should consider increasing the 
frequency of penalties when it discovers significant inaccuracies in such 
returns. State agencies should also consider similar measures for their 
required filings. 
These points are of course obvious and appear to have already been 
embraced at least in part by at least the IRS. What is less obvious, but 
also should be considered by these agencies, is the extent to which Big 
Data approaches implicate the larger concerns identified above. 250 More 
specifically, for privacy, IRS and state agencies need to consider what if 
any steps they should take to prevent personal information that is not 
required to be included in government filings, but that nonprofits 
inadvertently provide, from becoming publicly available. The IRS has in 
fact already taken at least one step in this regard, in that it removes 
social security numbers from e-filed Forms 990 before providing that 
information to Amazon Web Services.251 However, it acknowledged that 
it does not identify or redact other personally identifiable information 
such as home addresses and the ages of students receiving 
scholarships. 252 
The IRS and state agencies also have to be sensitive to the possibility 
that methods chosen may have unintentional but undesirable 
discriminatory effects. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has issued 
a report highlighting these concerns for private actors and Big Data, 
noting that to address this potential requires considering whether a data 
set is representative, whether a data model accounts for possible 
improper biases, how accurate predications based on Big Data actually 
are, and the appropriate balance between predictive accuracy and 
fairness considerations.253 Similar considerations need to reflected in 
evaluations of Big Data methods adopted to help oversee nonprofits. The 
last point is especially important, because even an algorithm that is 
highly successful in detecting legal noncompliance may have to be set 
aside if its results also are fundamentally unfair in that they 
249. See Von Lienen, supra note 44. 
250. See supra section III.B. 
251. Transcript of Webcast with Sunita Lough, Insights into the IR.S's New Data-Driven 
Approach to Examining Tax-Exempt Organizations (Part 1) (Oct. 11, 2017), in EO TAX J. 2017-
220 (Nov. 10, 2017). 
252. Id. 
253. FTC, supra note 157, at iv-v. 
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disproportionately identify noncompliance within, for example, 
organizations with a particular ideological bent. 
Concerns about government overreach, including possibly implicating 
constitutional and statutory limitations, should also temper proposals 
either to expand the information collected on required government 
filings or to gather information from external sources. The latter is of 
particular concern, given that the Congress has already chastised the IRS 
for obtaining information such as emails in possible violation of 
constitutional limitations.254 The IRS and state agencies should therefore 
be sure to measure such data gathering against such legal limitations. 
Congress and state legislatures also have a role that goes beyond 
overseeing the IRS and state agencies, respectively, in the areas already 
detailed. First and most obviously, they can mandate electronic filing of 
government forms required from nonprofits, thereby easing access to the 
information on such forms for the agencies and, if released, researchers 
and other private parties. This is particularly important given that 
organizations seeking to avoid regulatory and public scrutiny may 
increasingly avoid e-filing as access to e-filed returns increases, unless 
e-filing is mandatory. Congress has in fact recently imposed mandatory 
e-filing for tax-exempt nonprofits.255 
Congress and state legislatures also could take steps to address some 
of the larger concerns identified above. One step Congress should take is 
to enact a prohibition on private parties using individual information-
such as compensation-provided on nonprofit returns for commercial 
purposes, to address the privacy concern raised by the reporting and 
disclosure of such information.256 This is not unprecedented, as in other 
contexts where individuals are subject to public financial disclosures 
because of their affiliation with a particular type of organization or 
government position, Congress has prohibited the sale or use of 
information regarding these individuals for any commercial purpose.257 
At least one such rule has survived constitutional challenge. 258 Congress 
254. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
255. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
257. See 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 105(c)(l)(B) (2012) (information for senior government officials 
contained in ethics reports); 52 U.S.C. § 30l l l(a)(4) (2012) (information for contributors to 
candidates, political parties, and political committee); II C.F.R. § 104.15 (2019) (same); Sale or 
Use of Contributor Information, FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N, https://www.fec.gov/updates/sale-
or-use-contributor-information/ [https://perma.cc/ND7Z-DJF2] (same). 
258. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Int'! Funding Inst., 969 F.2d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en bane) 
(rejecting both a facial and an as applied challenge to 52 U.S.C. § 301 l l(a)(4) under the First 
Amendment). 
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and state legislatures could also be the appropriate venues for 
considering whether certain agency practices may come too close to or 
even cross constitutional and other legal limits, thereby possibly 
avoiding lengthy and expensive litigation. 
B. For Researchers 
Some researchers, both in the law and in other disciplines, have 
already started working with the existing and growing databases of 
government-collected information relating to nonprofits.259 As the 
amount and visibility of these data grows, presumably this group will 
also grow. This is a welcome development, as the resources and interests 
of government agencies are very limited, while private researchers 
should be able to tap additional funding sources and analyze important 
issues that may not attract agency attention. 260 In fact, at least one IRS 
official has encouraged feedback from private researchers. 261 
That said, researchers must be wary of at least two significant pitfalls. 
The first and most obvious one is the accuracy of the underlying data. As 
noted above, there are indications that at least the annual information 
returns filed with the IRS may contain significant inaccuracies for many 
nonprofits, particularly with respect to information that has public 
relations or rating implications.262 While it may be difficult to identify, 
much less correct, such inaccuracies, researchers should be sensitive to 
how such inaccuracies may affect their results. When possible, they also 
should seek other sources of information to corroborate and correct IRS-
provided data as necessary. 
The second and less obvious one is the so-called "streetlight effect," 
based on the story of the drunk looking for their keys under the 
streetlight even though they lost them elsewhere because "the light is 
better."263 The currently available machine-readable data is limited in at 
259. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text. 
260. Jes.5e Lecy, Nathan Grasse & Leonor Camarena, Do Female Board Members Reduce the Gender Pay 
Gap for Nonprofit Managers?, Panel at the fut'! Soc'y for Third-Sector Res. Conference (July 10-13, 2018), 
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.istr.org/resomce/resmgr/amsterdam/program.final_6. l2.18.pdf 
[https://perrna.cc/G2MH-MTIIK] ( discussing gender differences in compensation). 
261. See Lough, supra note 45 (inviting the public to look at the IRS-related e-filing data and 
"tell us what they're seeing"). 
262. See supra notes 162-168 and accompanying text. 
263. See Jake Linford, Datamining the Meaning(s) of Progress, 2017 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1531, 1554 n.121 
("[u]sing inapplicable but easily accessible data can contnbute to behavior based on bad infonnation, 
triggering a 'streetlight' effect''); David H. Freedman, Why Scientific Studies Are So Often Wrong: The 
Streetlight Effect, DISCOVER (July-Aug. 2010), http://discovermagazine.com/2010/jul-aug/29-why-
scientific-studies-often-wrong-streetlight-effect [https://permacc/3WES-MJ2F]. 
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least three important ways, each of which could cause researchers to 
unduly focus on certain aspects of the nonprofit sector or try to draw 
inappropriate conclusions from these limited data. One limitation is that 
the comprehensive IRS annual information return data only includes 
recently e-filed returns, although the NCCS databases provide older data 
for a limited set of fields from all returns.264 Use of these data therefore 
is not fully representative of the nonprofit sector of a whole and also 
only provides a limited historical perspective. 
Another limitation is that the annual information returns 
understandably focus primarily on financial data and on certain 
information relating to specific legal requirements. This makes them a 
rich source of information for legal and financial researchers but limits 
their usefulness for other purposes. For example, researchers interested 
in exploring the relative impacts of various nonprofits will likely find 
little information to assist in their efforts. Or worse, they may try to draw 
inappropriate conclusions from the data available-as is often the 
criticism made of rating agencies and others that rely heavily on 
administrative and fundraising to programmatic cost ratios. 265 
A third limitation involves organizations that either are permitted to 
file less lengthy annual information returns or are entirely exempted 
from filing any such returns. The former are usually limited to nonprofits 
that are smaller financially, which may make them less important for 
some but not all research purposes.266 The latter include most notably 
churches and church-related entities, but also include, among other 
entities, public colleges and universities.267 So a researcher interested in 
higher education would find the data they obtained from the IRS filings 
to be missing this important portion of that sector. 
None of these limitations necessarily undermine the usefulness of the 
increasingly available data regarding nonprofits, but they must be 
considered when designing research projects in order to avoid both 
misleading conclusions and neglect of certain aspects of the nonprofit 
sector. Because of these limitations, researchers who want to analyze 
issues not fully supported by the existing data will need to consider 
gathering data from other sources to address these representational and 
264. See supra notes 54, 94 and accompanying text. 
265. See Overhead Ratios Are Essential for Informed Giving, CHARITY WATCH, 
https://www.charitywatch.org/charitywatch-articles/overhead-ratios-are-essential-for-informed-
giving/133 [https://perma.cc/6RQB-WQG9] (summarizing the debate relating to using such ratios to 
evaluate charities while defending their use). 
266. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text. 
267. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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other concerns. A related concern is that by focusing on certain reported 
information, such as fundraising ratios, researchers may actually 
influence nonprofit behavior, at least for those nonprofits sensitive to 
how they are portrayed by researchers. 
C. For Nonprofits 
Finally, the nonprofits subject to the increasingly Big Data focused 
scrutiny of regulators and researchers need to consider how best to adapt 
to this change. First and most obviously, while the public nature of IRS 
annual information returns has long made them public relations 
documents as well as government filings, the increased access those 
returns and the data they contain only further emphasizes their public 
relations role. Particularly for nonprofits that depend on having a strong 
public reputation, ensuring that their returns both accurately and 
positively reflect their finances and activities will become even more 
important. This is in addition to ensuring that information that is 
sensitive and not required to be provided, such as home addresses of 
board members or social security numbers of employees, is not included 
in the returns. 
But even for nonprofits that are less sensitive to public perceptions, 
perhaps because they depend primarily on government contracts or a 
single donor for revenues, the increased access to their government 
filings could become problematic if those filings are not consistent with 
information in other databases, such as federal grant audit results, or 
other publicly available information sources, such as social media. For 
example, a state political organization filing revealed a donation by the 
Donald J. Trump Foundation to that organization even though the 
Foundation was prohibited from making such contributions by federal 
tax law and had, inaccurately, reported the grant as having been made to 
a similarly named but different, non-political organization on the 
Foundation's IRS annual information return.268 While that revelation did 
not prevent Donald Trump's election, it did create some negative 
publicity and forced him to both correct the expenditure, presumably by 
reimbursing the Foundation, and pay a penalty tax to the IRS on behalf 
268. Letter from Noah Bookbinder, Exec. Dir., Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in 
Washington, to John A. Koskinen, IRS Comrn'r (Mar. 21, 2016) (discussing how a Florida 
campaign finance filing by recipient political organization revealed donation from Foundation); see 
Allison Graves, Donald Trump, Pam Bondi and $25K: Was it pay to play?, POLITIFACT FLA. (Sept. 
21, 2016, 5 :53 PM), https:/ /www.politifact.com/florida/article/2016/sep/2 l/donald-trump-pam-
bondi-and-25k-was-it-pay-play/ [https://perma.cc/P2JW-V82S] (discussing the inaccurate reporting 
of donation on Foundation IRS annual return). 
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of the Foundation.269 As it becomes easier for not just regulators and 
academic researchers but also reporters, critics, and other members of 
the public to connect the dots of publicly available nonprofit 
information, ensuring that such issues do not arise will become 
increasingly important for most nonprofits. 
CONCLUSION 
In the United States and elsewhere, government regulators and 
interested private parties are starting to tum toward Big Data-the 
collection of enormous amounts of digital data analyzed with 
sophisticated machine learning tools-to better oversee and understand 
nonprofits. One of the advantages of being relatively late to adopt a Big 
Data approach is the ability to take advantage of the now significant 
amount of thought given to how such an approach can best enhance such 
oversight and what risks such an approach may present. 
Big Data may allow government regulators to deploy their limited 
resources in a much more efficient manner and to more effectively fulfill 
their oversight roles, which is very much needed given longstanding 
resource constraints. That said, to fully realize these promises, regulators 
and others must rigorously test the methods applied to determine 
whether and to what extent they improve efficiency and effectiveness of 
government oversight. It is not yet clear whether either the IRS or state 
regulators are committed to such rigorous review, although the IRS has 
indicated it has taken some steps along these lines. To the extent legally 
and pragmatically permissible, regulators should also make their 
methods visible to internal and external evaluators so as to enhance this 
review and at the same time minimize the perils posed by using Big Data 
techniques. 
As for those perils, regulators and private parties must be conscious of 
the limitations on the data available to them, in terms of accuracy and 
comprehensiveness, and on the analytical tools they employ. They must 
not forego the continued use of other methods to help compensate for 
these limitations. However, they must also be alert to the possibility that 
Big Data may lead to unintentional invasions of privacy, have prohibited 
disparate impacts, create temptations to increase government power 
beyond legislative mandates or infringe other legal limits. They must 
therefore establish procedures to detect and counter such possibilities if 
they arise. Fortunately, there is time to put such procedures in place at 
269. See Graves, supra note 268. 
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both the federal and state level, but this task must be considered an 
integral part of establishing a Big Data approach and not just an 
afterthought. If it is, then the perils of Big Data are likely to be avoided 
while its promises are fulfilled for the regulation of nonprofits. 
